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#### Anti-black violence is a paradigmatic constant that engenders human communities. The 1AC reiterates a chronopolitical grammar of progress that secures complicity for black dereliction.

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I argue that the white supremacy Spencer evinces, in which nonblack persons of color can be contributing members of human community, reinforces the constitutive exclusion of racially black persons from the Historical frame. The rub is that Spencer is not wrong. Racially black persons cannot be-in-time because as pre-human artifacts—the trace of humanism’s race/ism or cut—they bear the weight of Man’s ontological anxieties. The promise of a universal human imago implores nonblack persons of color to make room for themselves not in a vacuum, but in an Historical world (wound) adhered by racial hierarchies, such that by activating the plasticity of racial whiteness as a human recognition, they entrench the constitutive exclusion of racially black minorities from human be(com)ing. To refuse to capitalize on this plasticity, to refuse to reproduce the antiblack sentimentality and violence of Enlightenment Europe would consent to arriving to the table of human civilization too soon—at the dawn of Man, which is how Martin characterizes the African continent—and too late, failing altogether to qualify for the recognitions and protections reserved for human subjects of a civil polity. To be sure, civil rights necessitate human recognition because “civil society” is but a placeholder for the discursive and material organization of Man (i.e., Man’s racial myths and legal categories), and because the political economy of liberal humanism is generated within and through libidinal antiblackness. The episodic and contingent violence that nonblack persons of color experience (for example, in Trump’s America) is the affective lever civil society operates to demand generalized loyalty, obscuring for nonblack minorities the choice whereby they consent to make themselves the instruments of white supremacy. The mechanism through which that loyalty is elicited is not (just) the state’s demand but liberal—libidinal—humanism’s demand for a collective, planetary distancing from and rejection of racial blackness. A white qua not-black human imago is at once the subject of Alt-Right claims to exclusivity and liberal humanism’s claims to inclusivity. Ours is a world in which those who enjoy what Frantz Fanon describes as “ontological resistance”51 (i.e., human qua white recognition) experience, in Trump’s as in Obama’s America, the ebb and flow of human community (i.e., social life), while the excommunicated, or in Wilderson’s hauntingly apt analogy for racially black persons, the “cows”52—as the raw material that makes and sustains our human world-making—are indiscriminately and senselessly, without stipulation or explanation, “accumulated and, if need be, killed,”53 in order to cohere the collective unconscious of our human community and to engender its social markers of Man. Same shit, different day I have already suggested that Trump’s simulated inclusivity betrays the continuity of the office of the American president and that his arrival to the White/Master’s House coheres and testifies to a paradigm sutured by unremarkable and interminable antiblack violence, even or especially as nonblack minority populations experience new violations in Trump’s America. The contingent and selective recognition of nonblack persons of color as white-cum-human beings absolves—gives cover to—the enduring violence whereby the black as a subject-that-is-not-one is defeated by the protections liberal humanism’s political machinery—civil society—erects to safeguard Man in his most vulnerable iterations (i.e., “worker, woman, […] gay, lesbian, and so on”). While racialized violence reduces the nonblack body (of color) to flesh, nonblack persons of color and racially black persons do not occupy comparable space-time coordinates and/or structural positionalities, because humanism’s flesh-making project or race/ism is essentially an antiblack violence. Afro-pessimism teaches us that racially black persons occupy a structural position analogous, if at all, to non-human animal beings54, which like the slave acquire value in/as death—as a meaty carcass consumable/consumed for its parts, including skin, hair,55 bones, organs, and (the story of Henrietta Lacks teaches us) cells. It is for this reason that Wilderson uses the analogy of a meat-packing plant to replace the “negro question” with the “cow question,”56 and why Sexton describes the “paradigmatic condition of black existence in the modern world” as “a perpetual and involuntary openness”57 to the tearing apart and looting of black flesh. Hortense Spillers names the hyper-vulnerability of the unsignified/unsignifiable black flesh to remain from humanism’s cut as a “hieroglyphics.” She clarifies that the “anatomical specifications of rupture” assigned to black flesh invite “the objective description of laboratory prose”58—”eyes beaten out, arms, backs, skulls branded, a left jaw, a right ankle, punctured; teeth missing, as the calculated work of iron, whips, chains, knives … the bullet.”59 Surely, this is not the representational regime of a body [End Page 226] typified by cohesion. Wilderson’s, Sexton’s, and Spillers’ interventions are Afro-pessimistic60 insofar as they dissuade the reader from holding her breath for a political metamorphosis that might finally recognize black humanity. Black fungibility like animal fungibility (perhaps too, like earth-matter fungibility61) will abate only after an epistemological catastrophe disorganizes our relational capacities and dissolves every frame of reference, obliterating the chronopolitical grammar through which those who can become Man, that is to say, who can ascend to the top of a racial hierarchy that is also or primarily a food chain, do so. Franco Barchiesi elaborates the Afro-pessimistic position to remind us that “the shift from multicultural liberalism to nationalistic supremacism” in the hour of Trump “is a change only in the form of Black subjugation.”62 Black persons categorically denied human recognition as a fact and not (just) as an inconvenience of their being “do not merely confront [the] violence”63 nonblack minority populations like immigrants, indigenous persons, and nonblack gender non-conforming persons experience as an event—for example, as a travel ban or the dismissal of marriage and bathroom rights. Rather, black Others as a people forged, Audre Lorde explains, “in the crucibles of difference,”64 are “actually constituted by [violence] through processes of depredation, coercion, and enslavement.”65 Barchiesi’s incisive reading of Wilderson’s “Gramsci’s Black Marx” (2003) makes it clear that Trump’s presidency does not qualify as an historical node, which is to say, does not signify the end of times or a new time/beginning, but rather, evidences the longue durée of black social death as a world-ordering structure, more to the point, as the structure for our be(com) ing-human. It is precisely “the inhumanity of Blackness [that] allows White humans”66 including nonblack persons of color to build institutions, ideologies of freedom, images of rights, and ethical meditations on democracy. Such political and cognitive capacities posit [black] bodies as their inert, “socially dead,” Wilderson writes, yet sentient objects, or outlets of white fantasies of coercion, improvement, imagination, violence, and healing. The inhumanity of [blackness], or the fundamental antagonism between White life and [black] death, is ultimately the condition of existence for the political conflicts, moral dilemmas, and social emergencies of civil society, as well as its aptitude to experience and narrativize history as a succession of events.67 To argue that antiblack violence is paradigmatic—a structure and a constant—is to suggest that reforms to civil society will not abate the violence black Others necessarily must endure to make civil society, more to the point, to make or conceive of a social polity—an “us”—in the first place. Wilderson’s intervention, abridged by Barchiesi to clarify our present moment as altogether typical, insists that the reorganization [End Page 227] of civil society’s parts will not de-escalate the rates at which black persons are indiscriminately maimed and murdered, because black life is not contingently fungible but essentially so, and because the metaphysics and/as metapolitics of black fungibility are not just essential for the making of a socially dead black Other. They are principally and foremost essential for the making of a non-fungible or white-passing “us”.68 The story of that be(com)ing, of a human subject that is “semantically-neurochemically” programmed to enact antiblack “individual and collective behaviors,”69 is located in the hearts and minds of those eligible for human recognition, as a libidinal economy. Insofar as Trump and his henchmen (i.e., Spencer) use liberalism’s seemingly capacious parachute to trap the rights of nonblack minority populations, they mobilize not an American nightmare but one instance in the “ongoing disaster”70 of “the social” that is mobilized by the American Dream. Trump’s hate-mongering is our price of admission not just for a model of the social organized by/as civil society, but for the making of human community (i.e., the “social”), that is to say, for epistemology and ontology itself. Recall Hartman’s argument that “the very effort to pry apart the Negro question and the social question exposes their enduring entanglements”71 as a private relation. Libidinal interests, untouchable by the law but which determine the law72, “[shape] the emergence of the social in the United States”73 as a racially unified site in which the immigrant and savage find the civil rights that correspond with human recognition. While nonblack minorities in Trump’s America are being made to experience, albeit irregularly and provisionally, what Michael Harriot describes as “the America black people have always lived in,”74 which denies human recognition to revoke civil rights, for the black Other who lives in this nowhere or “sunken place,”75 it matters not who steers the American ship. Hillary Clinton’s presidency like Barack Obama’s before hers would have (at best) activated the elasticity whereby nonblack differences (in Obama’s America, gay and trans rights especially) are accommodated by entrenching the constitutive antagonism of racial blackness (such that the hour of the first black presidency testified to the fact that black lives don’t or can’t matter).76 The violent removal of Vietnamese-American doctor and ‘model minority’77 David Dao from United Flight 3411 on April 9, 2017 serves to illustrate what Damon Young of Very Smart Brothas describes as the contingent blackification of nonblack minority populations in Trump’s America. Young resolves that Dao “wasn’t quite [black] for a day,” but that he “was definitely treated like [he was].”78 The wanton and senseless nature of Dao’s physical beating rendered his body (of color) fungible as an event, because this violence defied his treatment otherwise, for example, in Obama’s multiculturalist, ‘post-racial’ America. More specifically, Dao’s psychological suffering in the video seen ‘round the globe evokes the psychosomatic terror (pace Fanon) typical of humanism’s flesh-making project, that is to say, its anti/blackness. The absolute wretchedness whereby Dao cannot articulate his suffering, his demonstration of a “pain [he] can’t live inside of and can’t live without,”79 indeed, of a pain which he cannot signify, contain, or cathect with recourse to “the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography”80 is expressed by the hopelessness with which Dao pleads with his captors to “just kill [him].” We might pause to ask why the video of Dao’s suffering captivated audiences as it did. Certainly, had Dao been black, the violation of his person would not have registered as a scandal. Videos of black suffering have the opposite effect, prompting us to stand not appalled and aghast but agape and mesmerized, chomping at the bit for (pace Hartman) more “scenes of subjection” that might (impossibly) satisfy our unabating human appetite for the flesh of the Other. In addition, scenes of black subjection function to reassure us that the human world will continue to make room for nonblack minority populations by discarding with the being of the black. Our absence from fugitive demands for black life—our sheer disregard of black fungibility, such that some of us can claim in the hour of Trump that “this is the first time [we’ve] protested anything”81—further suggests that black and nonblack minority populations do not wade through the muck and mire of racism together. Even as black persons show up to do our work, “[taking] up so many causes not immediately recognized as black,” for example, “the rights of Palestinians and Indigenous water protectors,”82 and even as nonblack minorities like Dao are violated in ways that testify to the interminability of antiblack political and (as) libidinal violence and to the consequences of that violence for nonblack persons of color, it is the black who has had to do the wading—the sinking and the dying—so that we who are not fungible can do the living.83 What is specific about and underwrites the antiblackness of this moment, if anything, is that audiences view Trump’s violence as exceptional, and in lamenting nonblack suffering in Trump’s America valorize the protections of the liberal state, obscuring its structural antiblackness.

#### Speculative democratic imagination re-elaborates the temporal prognoses that drain and imprison black energy.

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Does time heal all wounds? Or does time require certain wounds to sustain itself? Is the curative function of time an onto-metaphysical fantasy, one concealing the internecine operations of temporal subjugation? What happens to existence, or life itself, once we abandon time, its unquestioned positivity, and its presumed givenness (as gift, indispensable resource, or a priori condition)? Furthermore, is the activity of imagining even possible without recourse to time, temporality, or its durative schemas? Is the imagination a temporal captive, and does abandoning (or dare I say abolishing) time liberate the imagination to perform different tasks and pursuits? Questioning time is a difficult task, since thinking requires it (to re-orient existence beyond Newtonian, post-modern, or neo-liberal time and eschatology). Questioning, as meta-commentary, would require an exceptional position, both within and without time simultaneously, a position capable of investigating the very thing that enables investigation—holding time in abeyance. But the seeming impossibility of this enterprise would require a different noetic apparatus, since thought (as questioning) depends on time as its oxygen. The imagination, then, offers the promise of liberation from temporal tyranny, an enterprise contravening the conditions of reason, knowledge, forms, and, indeed, the possible itself. The potential “transgression”—to use a hackneyed term in American Studies—of the imagination is diminished, however, when it is bound to democracy. Democracy tethers the imagination to time, since democracy is an elaborate schematization, instrumentalization, and defense of time. During any moment of political and social crisis, we are importuned to re-imagine democracy, as imagining the future. To consider democracy futureless, or that its time has run out, or that futurity (and progress) is its devastating temporal myth, is to open oneself up to charges of theoretical heresy, despair, hopelessness, and any other abject calumny. In times of crisis, when the authoritarian kernel of democracy is exposed, theorists call on time to hold inconsistencies, resolve contradictions, blackmail hope, and repair brokenness. Once again, we land in the terrain that “time heals all wounds,” political or otherwise. Samuel A. Chambers defines the imagination as a “synthetic power of creation and re-creation—an ability to combine the uncombinable, to surpass binaries without merely collapsing them, to fashion something new” (620). And from such synthesis, we are told that a democratic imagination is possible, since we would “think the limits (and their transgression) of democratic theory and of democracy as well” (620). Here, we see that the democratic imagination recasts limits as possibilities rather than complete failures. Limits become the resource for creation and re-creation rather than evidence of destruction and uselessness. A couture Kantianism / Hegelianism (mixed with a splash of deconstruction) salvages democracy from the perils of its absurdity, devastation, and brutality. Why this investment in democracy’s “intrinsic” creative power? Can this creativity finally bring an end to anti-Black violence and Black suffering? Or is the knowledge of democracy’s fabulousness enough to sustain Blacks through police terrorism, environmental racism, re-enslavement through incarceration, and food / housing insecurity and discrimination? I would suggest that what makes such creative synthesis possible is an unacknowledged dependence on time. For proponents of democracy, it is time that is malleable for creative enterprises of re-imagination, of progress fetishization, and an “ontology of change” that need not justify (or prove) itself, declaration of change seems to be enough (Badiou, “Ontology”). What if, however, democracy is clinging to a depleted resource? What if time is no longer enough to orient existence, especially for those inhabitants of an abyss—within which time, space, ethics, and law are weaponized against existence? Put somewhat differently, democracy has exhausted the imagination. It is a speculative vampire that drains the imagination of any vital resource for its own survival. This speculation is an outrageous expenditure of energy, an enjoyment without end, a scholarly surplus-pleasure requiring an incessant (and useless) political repetition (Johnston). I would describe this speculation—the conjoining of time, democracy, and the imagination—as an interminable quest, or a certain “stuckness” in a scene of failure (a constant encircling of political and legal vacuity). This repetition is most dramatically demonstrated, for me, in Black political participation—voting, protesting, keeping hope alive, returning to the kernel of authoritarian violence (i. e., anti-Blackness) with unbridled hope, temporal determination, and an investment in the ontology of change (Warren; Farred). Time mocks Blacks, requiring historical déjà vu to be re-imagined, redeemed, rethought, or ignored, rather than accepting time as anti-Black enmity and democracy as the permanence of anti-Blackness. Chants of “yes we can!” “your vote matters!” “we have power!” “we’re moving forward,” etc., serve to neglect the failure of Black political participation and to imprison the imagination within futurity. As I am writing these remarks, I am witnessing the absurdity of this democratic imagination and its unrelenting time. On one news program, I hear that police shot unarmed Andre Hill, a forty-seven-yearold Black resident of Columbus, Ohio, without cause, and rather than offering him medical assistance, decided to handcuff him (just in case the supine, dying man finds a gun, magically, I guess). On the other news program, I hear Black politicians importuning, begging, and guilting Blacks into voting for change. Black political pundits assure voters that the ontology of change is realizable if you just exercise your right to vote. “Never again!” “We will transform police practices!” “This time will be different!” Did Blacks not vote when police shot twelve-year-old Tamir Rice as he was playing with his toy gun on the playground? (By the way, no federal charges will be brought against the police officers who shot him). Did Blacks not vote when Sandra Bland lost her life in police custody? Did Blacks not vote after police deprived Eric Garner and George Floyd (and apparently 70 other people) of breath (Baker et al.)? In answer to my inquiry “why should we continue to vote if anti-Black violence is not changing?” I am told, “Just keep believing, we can vote people in that can change things!” When I then ask, “But I voted for President Obama (suspending my nihilism in an intoxication of hope-affect), I thought things were going to change for Blacks? I feel just as unsafe and endangered post-Obama as pre-Obama,” I am told, “Obama wasn’t a ‘magic Negro.’ He did the best he could.” Then I ask, “So why vote if it will take an act of magic to address the existential threat of anti-Blackness?” Time mocks the cyclical movement of such inquiries, they are, indeed, unanswerable within the creative, synthetic, and powerful democratic horizon. Voting becomes the premier instrument of the democratic imagination—supposedly, it activates the imagination with futurity, avoids paralysis with action, and can be repeated. What type of creativity will finally eradicate anti-Black brutality? And could such creativity even operate within time? Could we still call such creativity democracy? Must we abandon time to enable the imagination to perform the mystical, the magical, and the ineffable? If we have understood nihilism as the entrapment (and misery) of metaphysics, the reduction of Being to value circulation (axio-ontology) and Being’s forgottenness, and the neutralization of various hierarchies of existence and legitimacy (Vattimo), then Black nihilism would suggest that time is not a natural right or intrinsic resource. Time is a supreme onto-metaphysical value that traffics in anti-Black violence, subjugation, destruction, and must also be reduced to myth, fantasy, and displaced. Rather than providing the resource for creativity and power, time is a racial privilege that embeds itself in Being and metaphysics—it anchors the human and engenders extreme brutality and destructive pleasure. It is impossible, then, to de-link time from the anti-Black violence saturating it. Enterprises such as Black politics and democratic imagination reproduce the “same” rather than introducing a break in violence. Put differently, the democratic imagination takes time for granted as a natural right or unquestioned condition of existence, rather than bringing this condition under investigation and suspicion; reproducing time, as a creative and synthetic activity, is its primary preoccupation. Black existence exposes time as an unreliable lure, one vested in certain onto-metaphysical fantasies. I would add to Vittorio Possenti’s remarkable anatomizing of nihilism—theoretical, moral, theological, technological, and judicial—spatio-temporal nihilism, since both space and time provide problems for Black thinking in the abyss and demand a protocol of thinking (or imagination?) that is released from the preconditions of Being and ethics. Black nihilism de-idealizes both space and time as offering anything intrinsically or potentially transformative. Thus, the limit of space and time, for Black existence, cannot be re-worked into anything life-affirming or synthesized into anything meaningful. To put a finer point on this reflection: Anti-Blackness is a problem of time and the democratic imagination. Police shootings and COVID-19 deaths, for example, foreground the failure of time to alleviate Black suffering. Time is not curative; it is a weapon of tremendous violence. Despite the optimism of Black political theorists, time entraps Black thinking in a web of contradictions, absurdities, and impasses. The pathetic theorizing of Melvin Rogers, for example in his “Between Pain and Despair: What Ta-Nehisi Coates Is Missing,” presents an incredibly impoverished, unreliable, and inept reading of Black pessimism and the crisis of Black existence—it links democratic action to the imagination and clings to an “ontology of change” despite all evidence to the contrary in Black life. His work, however, represents a coterie of Black political optimists so ~~blinded~~ by democracy’s promise that they consider Black pain a form of political possibility. It is a perverse enterprise capitalizing on what we might call black jouissance—futurity constitutes the “temporal material” for surplus-pleasure in Black suffering, travail, and political failure. If there is any hope for the imagination and its endless circulation in contemporary Black thought, it will need to abandon time and refuse its seductions. The future is but one temporal value we must de-idealize and insert into an anti-Black will to power—one wreaking havoc across the globe. In these desperate times, Black existence needs a liberated imagination, an imagination liberated from formal thought, the world, destructive transcendence and immanence, and dogmatic preconditions. So, why continue to expend energy re-imagining the future and democracy? Let us focus Black imagining on enterprises that sustain us in the abyss. Outlining and presenting such enterprises requires tremendous spiritual and intellectual energy—but such investment is all we have.

#### Pursuit of hegemony emerges from an anti-black paradigm that supplements domestic policing and stokes instability.

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When I began writing this column, Black Hawk helicopters were still circling over Washington, DC, flying low to intimidate and disperse protestors demanding justice for yet another murder of an unarmed Black person, this time George Floyd by Minneapolis police.

While the spread of popular uprisings against police brutality across the United States feels like an unprecedented tipping point, the impunity with which police and military forces operate is not new. Nor is it isolated to domestic policing. The willingness to weaponize state power against those expressing their discontent and calls for change has long been a part of both US domestic and foreign policy.

Some Washington national security professionals have made laudable statements committing to do better to address the structural inequities that keep the profession majority-white and cis-male in the face of this repression. Yet these efforts have not addressed the fundamental problem at hand: the state violence taking place in streets across the United States is a natural outgrowth of decades, if not centuries of domestic and foreign policy that first and foremost relies on the dehumanization of Black and brown people to pursue hegemony at home and abroad. Until we reckon with this fundamental truth, we will continue to fail to actually address the institutionalized and structural racism that has led to decade after decade of state violence against Black people in this country and people of color around the world.

In the United States, this dehumanization has its roots in the founding of our country. The prosperity the white majority in the United States enjoys today cannot be divorced from the genocide of Indigenous people and the enslavement of Africans, all for the economic benefit of white colonizers. The violent domination of the white colonial project and its basis in exploitation and white saviorism not only defined the foundations of early US society, but is echoed today here at home, and in US foreign policy.

For decades, the United States military has used many of the same tactics abroad that are used against Black and brown people by police in the United States. The use of force is never a last resort, but instead the preferred tool to ensure submission. Local conditions, individual experiences, and other drivers to violence, dissent, or crime – often rooted in governance failure, human rights abuses, and economic and/or political disenfranchisement – are ignored. Instead, a more pernicious, dangerous motive is assigned to all members of subjugated groups once one individual decides to resort to violence or commit a crime.

A violent response is then justified in cloaked language about patriotism, security, and saviorism. The United States military is undertaking dangerous missions against “extremists” to “save” the Afghan people, to “secure freedom” for Iraqis; just as in the United States police are keeping the streets of the US “safe,” tracking “extremists” that threaten the status quo and private property. As the experience of the past several weeks has shown, however, violence from the oppressive force ultimately begets more defiance. The idea that violence can quell dissension is ultimately rooted in the orientalist, racist belief that non-white people are inherently threats that must ultimately be silenced in order for stability to take hold.

The US government’s use of force is continuously justified by its stated intention to create safety — but safety for whom? Surely not the countless innocents killed in endless wars abroad, the diaspora communities surveilled, or the Black people murdered by police here at home. The Trump administration’s current militarized response to the popular uprisings sweeping the country is merely an outgrowth of long-standing policies that have devalued Black and brown lives, and ignored the unique injustices and inequities these communities face in achieving safety, well-being, and liberation. The post-9/11 police state and outdated slavery-era laws merely provide useful levers for Trump to pull in the face of this new challenge to his power.

If people in power continue to see these latest instances of violence and repression as isolated, unfortunate instances that “don’t reflect who we are as a nation,” then we will have failed to truly challenge and disrupt the forces and systems at play that have allowed white supremacy to infiltrate every aspect of US public life, including foreign policy.

#### Extinction discourse violently subsumes Black suffering into a monolithic conception of human collectivity.

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In “Blackness and the Pitfalls of Anthropocene Ethics,” Axelle Karera interrogates discourses of disaster and crisis in relation to perceptions of ecological disaster. Karera contends that analyses of the immense of disaster are predicated on an insistence on collectivity that is bolstered by racial erasure. Thus, the discussion of the Anthropocene by many theorists presupposes a Human or ecological teleological progression, together with threats of demise that ahistorically subsume Blackness into a collective form of being that is central to Black suffering. Karera argues that, “insofar as the constant recognition of our existential interdependency cannot substantially challenge the many forms of segregations on the steady rise in our current times, it seems to me that assuming the inevitability of our ontological entanglement may need some re-thinking.”24 After citing the work of Fred Moten in relation to what she calls “relationality’s inability to maintain its ethical currency when faced with the extended rupture blackness sustains on ethics,” Karera continues, “In other words, relationality is inherently not only a position that the black cannot afford or even claim. The structure of relationality is essentially the condition for the possibility of their enslavement. I wonder, therefore, whether our naïve reliance on a type of inherent co-dependence has recently done more harm than good—that is to say, has instead worked to obstruct the very possibility of a positive transformation of our ethical sensibilities.”25 According to Karera, the linking of structural relationality to the conditions of slavery is key. For Blackness, segregation, interdependency, and slavery are relational rather than legally imposed. As such, the interdependence thesis (that we are all in this together) overshadows how the social structuring of Black life and death makes the collective “we” a structurally impossible equivalency, despite the affective and emotional desire for such to be true. Integration also constitutes a problem of relationality or the lack thereof. More to the point, the constitution of “we” is a form of violence that makes the particularities of Black suffering indiscernible under the auspices of equal rights and liberties in private and public spaces. In this respect, Hartman contends that “a slippage between race and status can be detected in the uncertain identi­fi­cation of the source of black degradation,” where the locus of suf­fering is frequently underscored because of the insistence on perceiving the problem as the lack of relational congruency across races with respect to specific phenomenon like global sickness.26 Rather, the conditions of suf­fering must be scaled outward, rather than inward with a narrow focus on pandemic and disease, to address the ethical stakes at the heart of Black death. Thus, employing Karera’s “positive transformation of our ethical sensibilities” to address the conditions of Gatewood’s death requires an acknowledgment of negligence on the part of Beaumont Hospital, together with a cognitive mapping of how care, protection, and safety as conceptual frameworks isolate Blackness as an excisable contagion that is subjected to gratuitous violence that so often leads to spectacularized or muted death. By muted death, I mean forms of death produced by anti-Blackness that go unseen, unaccounted for, or unknown.

#### The alternative affirms an insurgent black feminine otherwise that disarticulates Man’s chronopolitical order.

Malaklou 18, Assistant Professor of Critical Identity Studies at Beloit College, a Mellon Faculty Fellow of the Associated Colleges of the Midwest and Visiting Faculty at the Centre for Expanded Poetics in the Department of English at Concordia University in Montréal. (M. Shadee, January 2018, “‘Dilemmas’ of Coalition and the Chronopolitics of Man: Towards an Insurgent Black Feminine Otherwise”, *Theory & Event*, Volume 21, Number 1, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/685977>)

If Afro-pessimism is necessarily a black feminism—Wilderson explains, “Afro-pessimism is made possible by the critical labors of a particular strand of Black feminism, a la [Saidiya] Hartman and [Hortense] Spillers”137—then its critique, which elaborates “the world, and maybe even the whole possibility of and desire for a world” as the “master’s tools” of Audre Lorde’s intervention,138 arms the black feminist argument with ammunition to forge a cosmology typified not by plentitude but by lack. This cosmology is grounded not by phallic signification but by a “perpetual and involuntary openness,” which—Sexton teaches us—is “the “paradigmatic condition of black existence in the modern world.”139 The notable difference between an Afro-pessimistic approach and a black feminist one, if any, is that Afro-pessimism accepts and leans into the paradigmatic structure of black antagonism, accepting the Historical alienation that typifies social death, it bears clarifying, not as a closed door to social life but as a portal into an/Other sociality—off the record. Without a name or referent, the “elsewhere and elsewhen” of black social life, which “sprouts out of the wet places in [our] eyes…the waiting places in [our] palms, [and] the tremble holding in [our mouths],”140 finds refuge in black femininity because (pace Spillers) the immateriality of gender in the black instance does not default the metaphysics of racial blackness to phallic masculinity but to invaginated femininity. Speaking to a different audience, Lewis Gordon explains that the racially black man as (pace Spillers) the personification “female flesh ungendered” is always already feminine. He writes,

The black man is caught. He cannot reject his femininity without simultaneously rejecting his blackness, for his femininity stands as a consequence of his blackness and vice versa. Standing in front of a white [human] wall, he appears as a hole, as a gaping, feminine symbol to be filled, closed up, by the being who has being.141

Doubly penetrable as hole—as the invaginated Other of Freud’s phallocentrism and the human-animal Other Fanon describes—the black (feminine) is a figure that awaits signification interminably. Powerless to “escape concealment under the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography,”142 the black (feminine) conjures Other ways of being and knowing that “can be felt and perceived even though—or especially if—[they] remain unrecognizable or unintelligible to our current common senses.”143 Excommunicated from the historical frame, the black (feminine) gives sanctuary to our freedom dreams. Hers is the safe harbor that guards black life from humanism’s thieving reach. And, as “the historical evocation of chaos”144—as (pace Fanon) an im/ possibility for time—the black (feminine) rages against the machine to disarticulate the “historical categories” that engender human be(com) ing in the first place.

In an exchange with Wilderson, Hartman summons the life and writings of Harriet A. Jacobs to claim the non-negotiable centrality of the black feminine as “the space of death, where negation is the captive’s central possibility for action.”145 Black femininity as a “content [that] exceeds […] expression”146—recall that the black (feminine) “[presents as] a virtual blank” and has no shape or meaning—models the social life of social death and is the harbinger of an occult Otherwise. That is to say, the black (feminine) is pregnant/impregnable with possibilities for a non-Historical becoming. She disarticulates the spatialization of time qua the racialization of time to “[interrupt] the habitual formation of bodies;”147 her #blackgirlmagic indexes an/Other time—a gestational time—to induce “chaos” for the record and the record-keeper alike. Following Annie Menzel’s reading of maternal generativity, the black feminine as the site of maternity—the black womb—invokes “unspeakable violence with insurgent horizon.”148 Not just void, the black feminine-cum-maternal engenders another space for living, not in-time but divested from time as the marker of forward-movement and teleological development. Hers is not the time of History (i.e., Man’s chronopolitical order), which Walter Benjamin describes as a “homogenous, empty time”149 that dialectically (re)produces “the ‘time of the now’”150 in/as the time of tomorrow—of futurity, or humanism. Rather, hers is an embryonic and gestational time, which like the slow and stalled time of captivity qua the oceanic is the insurgent and occult time of waiting/wading and wanting.151 While the birth canal, in Christina Sharpe’s pointed rendering, is a “domestic middle passage” that “[disfigures] black maternity, [turning] the womb into a factory (producing blackness as abjection much like the slave ship’s hold and the prison)” and demanding from the black mother the reproductive labor of chattel slavery—Sharpe explains that the birth canal “[ushers children] into her condition; her non-status, her non-being-ness”152—the black womb, as a container for gestation and not the vehicle for entry, specifically, as embryonic space-time suspends black life to nurture its emergent but not-yet-emerging Otherwise.

Taking inspiration from Spillers’ exhortation in “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe” (1987) to “make a place for” the black (feminine) as a “[non-Historical] social subject,” not to make room for her in “the ranks of gendered femaleness”—in humanism’s liberal folds—but to claim her “insurgent ground,”153 which Menzel describes as Spillers’ call for a “maternal temporality of continuous upheaval,”154 I submit, in closing, that the black feminine qua maternal, as Rizvana Bradley describes her, a “(w)holeness”155 that, as Toni Morrison memorably insists, “consistently [defies] classification,”156 is at once void (i.e., socially dead) and pregnant (i.e., with social life). She summons the revolution that we—all of us, black and nonblack persons (of color) alike—seek, not (just) as a salve for Trump’s violence but as the escape hatch we can use to flee the White/Master’s house, the violence of liberal humanism as the architect of chattel slavery and colonialism, and the container for human be(com)ing—History—that constrains our movements generally. To live in the space-time of the black womb’s oceanic is to be swallowed up by the infinite expanse of racial blackness. As the site of an/Other social, this embryonic space-time disarticulates Man’s chronopolitical order and is the “elsewhere and elsewhen” that we have been looking for, to date, in the wrong place—in the letter of the law of a civil society that operationalizes humanism’s race/ism. We might find our freedom instead in the black mother, who uses the resources she does not have to hold and to carry, indeed, to make life-generat-ing black poetry from the grammar of this wor(l)d’s insatiably violent antiblack prose.

#### Plan focus is a smokescreen. Vote negative to foreground scholarship that better articulates black suffering.

Sexton 10, Professor of African American Studies and Film and Media Studies at the University of California, Irvine. (Jared, “African American Studies”, published in *A Concise Companion to American Studies*, pg. 220-221, Blackwell Publishing Ltd)

The latter task – the trenchant interrogation of racial blackness and/in the formulations of modernity and its leitmotif of freedom – was advanced immeasurably by Professors Lindon Barrett, Denise Ferreira da Silva, and Ronald Judy, each in their own way. Yet, as Wilderson again makes plain in his Red, White, and Black (2009), the grand and anxious question of freedom is preceded, logically and ontologically, by a perhaps more confounding question: what does it mean to suffer? To address such a query sufficiently is to disregard the official impatience that envelopes it. Of course, this sentiment of expediency plays to an understandably popular urgency that emanates from the severity of everyday life for the vast majority of black people and the attendant status anxiety of the so-called new black middle class. However, black creative intellectuals have done less and less talking about our pain of late and probably a bit too much posturing about our plans. If anything, we have a surplus of plans! What we do not have is a language – much less a political culture – that adequately articulates both the variance and commonality of our positions and our predicaments. African American Studies is perhaps more inarticulate about the dimensions and details of black suffering today, in an era marked by transnationalism and multi-racialism, than it has been at any other historical juncture. I am speaking here of suffering in its fullest sense: not only as pain, which everyone experiences – say, the pain of alienation and exploitation – but also as that which blacks must bear, uniquely and singularly, that which we must stand and stand alone (see Sexton 2007).

The proposal and invitation continues:

The yield of this gathering will be to assemble leading scholars alongside emergent voices in the field of African American Studies in order to reflect critically upon the mutual implication of a proliferate and diverse racial formation with the living legacies of the black radical tradition in the age of American empire. The symposium seeks to depart from prevailing frameworks for comparative ethnic studies – that is, discerning how the respective experiences of blacks and other people of color are similar or dissimilar and what have been their historic interactions – to consider how the matrix of enslavement, which is to say the invention of “propertized human being” (Harris 1993), has not only shaped myriad forms of oppression and marginalization, but has compromised their modes of resistance and [their] claims to independence as well. If there is an overarching objective here, it is to properly illuminate what might be termed the obscurity of black suffering, to rescue it from the murky backwaters of persistent invisibility as well as the high-definition distortions of glaring and fascinated light.

Proper illumination is a catchy byline, an instance of wishful thinking, if ever there was one. But can we not speak of it more charitably, perhaps as a stratagem? Or as a spur that exercises the limits of our thinking?

In her ground-breaking Scenes of Subjection, Saidiya Hartman calls our attention to the ease with which scenes of spectacular violence against the black body – what she terms “inaugural moment[s] in the formation of the enslaved” – are reiterated in discourses both academic and popular, “the casualness,” she writes, “with which they are circulated, and the consequences of this routine display of the slave’s ravaged body”:

Rather than inciting indignation, too often they immure us to pain by virtue of their familiarity – the oft-repeated or restored character of these accounts and our distance from them are signaled by the theatrical language usually resorted to in describing these instances – and especially because they reinforce the spectacular character of black suffering. [. . .] At issue here is the precariousness of empathy and the uncertain line between witness and spectator. Only more obscene than the brutality unleashed at the whipping post is the demand that this suffering be materialized and evidenced by the display of the tortured body or endless recitations of the ghastly and terrible. In light of this, how does one give expression to these outrages without exacerbating the indifference to suffering that is the consequence of the benumbing spectacle or contend with narcissistic identification that obliterates the other or the prurience that too often is the response of such displays. (Hartman 1997: 4)

To put it bluntly, how does one engage with black suffering at all without simply erasing it – refusing it, absorbing it, appropriating it – in the very same gesture? Hartman’s inventive response to what might appear, at first glance, to be a rhetorical question or a cruel joke (that is, making a case with evidence that is, strictly speaking, inadmissible) is to move away from the expected “invocations of the shocking and the terrible” and to look, alternately, at “scenes in which terror can hardly be discerned,” “the terror of the mundane and quotidian,” what she phrases appositely as “the diffusion of terror.” What she finds, if calling it a “finding” is not immediately to betray it, is the recapitulation – the repetition and summation – of this spectacular primal scene across the entirety of the social text of racial slavery and its aftermath. That is to say, it is never the case that this terror is not present. It saturates the field of encounter. It is ubiquitous and yet it is, perhaps for the same reason, barely discernible. One wonders thus: how might the discussion of this dispersed, ambient terror become any more compelling than that which is condensed and acute? The point being not that blacks enter the wrong evidence or pursue the wrong argument, but rather that they are disallowed from entering evidence or building arguments in the first place, barred, as it were, from bringing charges and levying claims of grievance or injury as such. Again, what does it mean to suffer, in this way? This “challenge,” as Hartman modestly calls it, of giving expression to the inexpressible is taken up again in Fred Moten’s remarkable text, In the Break. In fact, it is the discrepancy between subjection and objection that launches the accomplishment of a project opened and closed around the impossibility and the inevitability of “the resistance of the object” (Moten 2003: 1). That, at least, is how it sounds to me. What is disquieting and provocative in this exchange is what I take to be a certain turning away from the implications of Hartman’s precarious distinction between witness and spectator, a positional instability that is not mitigated by transpositions in the sonic register, nor, for that matter, in the performance arts more generally (Barrett 1999; Weheliye 2005).

## ADVANTAGE ONE

### 1NC---Advantage 1

#### Positing technology as a solution to warming is scientific saviorism based in racialized Enlightenment logics---AND extinction reps are anti-black

Gergan et al. 18, \*Assistant Professor of Geography @ FSU. \*\*Associate Professor of Geography, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. \*\*\* Assistant Professor of Women’s & Gender Studies and African & African Diaspora Studies @ UT at Austin. (Mabel, Sara Smith, and Pavithra Vasudevan, “Earth beyond repair: Race and apocalypse in collective imagination”, Published in *Environment and Planning* D: Society and Space; DOI: 10.1177/0263775818756079, pg. 7-8)

Fears of an ecological catastrophe fueled by industrialization and overconsumption are reflected in the growing genre of climate fiction or “cli-fi” (Dan Bloom, cited in Svoboda, 2016). Whether they take the form of a hurricane full of sharks in Sharknado, rising seas in Waterworld, synchronized hailstorms, tornadoes and blizzards in The Day After Tomorrow (TDAT) or the eruption of the earth’s core in 2012, cli-fi films portend impending disaster where nature takes revenge on an unwitting human population that realizes its mistakes too late. On the surface, cli-fi films challenge climate inaction by sensationalizing extreme events, a liberal Hollywood version of Al Gore’s charge to accept the “inconvenient truth” of climate change. However, erasing the work of earlier generations of eco-apocalyptic fables, such as Carson’s Silent Spring which inspired a generation of environmental activism, cli-fi obfuscates the connections between climate change and structural conditions in a battle of (triumphant survivor) Man v. (vengeful uncontrollable) Nature. In cli-fi, disaster becomes another storyline for proclaiming white victory. The predominant tendency in cli-fi is the representation of the apocalypse as “The Great Deluge”: a real or figurative wave that threatens to overwhelm all humanity in climate events of biblical proportions. TDAT is said to have generated more than ten times the news coverage than the, 2001 IPCC report, and had a significant impact on public understanding of climate change (Lieserowitz, 2004). At the center of the story is a paleoclimatologist who draws attention to an imminent Ice Age but is ignored by the powers that be. Superstorms wreak havoc, and the scientist must save his trapped son in New York City. At the end, the new Ice Age arrives, covering the northern hemisphere in ice and snow, signaling that few survived except a small (mostly white) resilient band. While TDAT was critiqued by many climatologists for indulging in sensationalism and undermining scientific research, the movie portrays the scientific community as morally unfettered to a corrupt establishment. Here, scientists stand in for stewards of the earth, who are charged with both a moral authority and responsibility, a sentiment also reflected in Steffen et al.’s (2007) final stage of the Anthropocene. This stage speculates how geo-engineering efforts might offer solutions to our destructive human impact. This framing of science as savior obscures how a scientific rationality laid the foundation for Enlightenment thinking and the Industrial Revolution (Lovbrand et al., 2009). € The “Great Deluge” trope retrenches inherited categories of “human” versus “nature” implicit in the Anthropocene. Matthews and Simpson (2014: 22), note that cli-fi “presents an unexpectedly feral, unpredictable environment where an aggressive nature runs rampant.” Even if such stories begin with a critique of overconsumption, mid-way through the narrative, the causal arrow points squarely at a vengeful nature that must be subdued by humans. In TDAT, (as in World War Z, below), the stand in for “human” is a white middle-aged man, evoking the white savior trope and the scientist/savior figure (Murray and Heumann, 2014). As Tuck and Ree (2013: 640) note, mainstream (horror) US films are “preoccupied with the hero, who is perfectly innocent, but who is assaulted by monstering or haunting just the same.” TDAT invests white characters with scientific authority, as in one scene where a Black police officer ignores the white lead’s warnings, a mistake that ultimately costs his and others’ lives (McGreavy and Lindenfeld, 2014: 124). As climate change is declared a global Gergan et al. 7 threat, white maleness stands in for a universal human subject and the first sites to be destroyed are located in the northern hemisphere. On a more fundamental level, the threat to “humanity” represented in Great Deluge films are perhaps expressing what Baldwin (2016: 84) terms a white affect, a “pre-discursive intensity that forms when white positionality confronts the fantasy of its own death.” For a growing number of people, however, extreme weather events are not a dystopian future but a grim reality, while simultaneously, the presumed threat of “climate refugee” incursions is used to effect a securitization that targets migrants themselves (Ahuja, 2016; Bettini, 2013; Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012; Hartmann, 2010). Unlike the protagonists of TDAT, for those actually facing climate change, “The world is sectioned into nationals and nationalities for those who cannot afford to move or travel beyond their home countries. For the rich, the world is indeed transnational and deterritorialized” (Miyoshi, 2001: 292). The flip side of these films is the desire for a security apparatus reliant on technological innovation and governance. Through the construction of a seemingly universal post-racial apocalypse, Great Deluge films suggest “the guarantee of white supremacy lies in its capacity to contain the excess” (Baldwin, 2016: 84) of climate change’s consequences. In films like TDAT, risks posed by climate change are displaced onto others who are seen as lacking the resourcefulness of the survivor and viewer. This deferral of disaster to the future erases the ways in which climate change already affects livelihoods (differentially). The urgency of apocalypse promotes a temporality of anticipated white precarity belying the root causes of the Anthropocene in the longue durée of racial capitalism. While Hollywood movies in general center white male characters, cli-fi films portrayal of a universal human threat through the experience of a white Western core is at odds with realities of disparate vulnerability articulated by climate justice movements (e.g. Chatterton et al., 2013; Pettit, 2004; Pulido, 2012). This critique also draws our attention to the uneven geopolitics of climate change and science (Lukinbeal and Zimmermann, 2006), and how humanity has been defined in violent opposition against Black people (Weheliye, 2014).

#### R&D and immigration shortages thump innovation.

Vaswani 20, Asia business correspondent. (Karishma, 9-11-2020, "Ex-Google boss: US 'dropped the ball' on innovation", *BBC News*, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54100001)

In the battle for tech supremacy between the US and China, America has "dropped the ball" in funding for basic research, according to former Google chief executive Eric Schmidt. And that's one of the key reasons why China has been able to catch up. Dr Schmidt, who is currently the Chairman of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, said he thinks the US is still ahead of China in tech innovation, for now. But that the gap is narrowing fast. "There's a real focus in China around invention and new AI techniques," he told the BBC's Talking Business Asia programme. "In the race for publishing papers China has now caught up." China displaced the US as the world's top research publisher in science and engineering in 2018, according to data from the World Economic Forum. That's significant because it shows how much China is focusing on research and development in comparison to the US.For example, Chinese telecoms infrastructure giant Huawei spends as much as $20bn (£15.6bn) on research and development - one of the highest budgets in the world. Dr Schmidt blames the narrowing of the innovation gap between the US and China on the lack of funding in the US. "For my whole life, the US has been the unquestioned leader of R&D," the former Google boss said. "Funding was the equivalent of 2% or so of GDP of the country. Recently R&D has fallen to a lower percentage number than was there before Sputnik." According to Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a US research institute, the US government now invests less in R&D compared to the size of the economy than it has in more than 60 years. This has resulted in "stagnant productivity growth, lagging competitiveness and reduced innovation". Dr Schmidt also said the US's tech supremacy has been built on the back of the international talent that's been allowed to work and study in the US - and warns the US risks falling further behind if this kind of talent isn't allowed into the country. Tech war "This high skills immigration is crucial to American competitiveness, global competitiveness, building these new companies and so forth," he said. "America does not have enough people with those skills." The US has been embroiled in a tech cold war with China and in recent months has stepped up its anti-China rhetoric. This week it revoked the visas of 1,000 Chinese students it claims have military links and accused Chinese tech firms of acting as agents for the Chinese Communist Party - claims Beijing and these companies reject. The Trump administration has also taken steps to block Chinese tech firms like Huawei and Chinese apps including TikTok and WeChat, saying they pose threats to national security. Beijing has said this is "naked bullying", and Dr Schmidt says the bans will mean China will be even more likely to invest in its own domestic manufacturing. Dr Schmidt says the right strategy for a US-China relationship is what is called a 'rivalry partnership' where the US needs to be able to "collaborate with China, while also competing with them". "When we're rivals, we are rough, we are pursuing things. We're competing hard, we're trying to get advantage - real competition - which the US can do well, and which China can do well. But there's also plenty of areas where we need to be partners."

#### Emerging tech won’t tip the balance of power.

Gilli 19, Senior Researcher in the Research Division, NDC. (Andrea, Feb. 2019, “Preparing for ‘NATO-mation’: the Atlantic Alliance toward the age of artificial intelligence”, *NDC Policy Brief*, No. 4, pg. 3, Accessible at: http://nato-70.upt.pt/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Preparing\_NATO\_mation.pdf)

Military transformation and emerging technologies

A second, and related, issue is the risk that, in the age of intelligent machines, AI, ML and BD may easily enable any actor to catch up, or even outpace, its adversaries in military terms. Here too, skepticism is warranted. First of all, these two concerns logically contradict each other. If we are witnessing a military transformation based on dual-use, general-purpose technologies such as AI, ML and BD that can be easily exploited in battle, then no actor can achieve a significantly enduring military advantage – at the tactical, operational or strategic level – as competitors can quickly catch up or deploy effective counter-systems.8

Next, military power is more than hardware. Tactical fluency and operational competence are in fact extremely important for victory on the battlefield – along with other variables. There is no reason to believe that this will change anytime soon, as warfare, war and by extension strategy are inherently adversarial: winners succeed because they defeat their adversaries – i.e., they neutralize enemy counter-measures, tactics, systems and innovations. Possessing capable hardware is thus, per se, not sufficient and, at times, not even necessary for winning. Commercial technologies offer great potential but are easily vulnerable to even basic counter-measures as they are not designed for combat.

By the same token, emerging technologies – whether developed for commercial or military applications – face performance trade-offs that constrain their immediate military utility. The French Marine Nationale’s mid-19th century bid to offset British naval superiority is telling: the steam engine granted independence from wind but suffered from limited endurance; iron hulls could not keep afloat when hit; and, explosive shells had shorter ranges than solid shots. When mature, these technologies ultimately transformed naval warfare, but it took almost a century for this to happen.9

There is no reason to believe that with AI, ML and BD things will be different. When it comes to software, in fact, even subtle and apparently minor details lead to catastrophic failure: because of simple mistakes in data gathering or processing such as automatic path control, military platforms may end up exceeding their maximum depth or altitude ceilings and thus expose themselves to almost certain mission failure. Software already represents the primary source of procurement delays and cost overruns. As software becomes more central in weapon systems, the problems it creates can only exponentially increase. Additionally, through generative adversarial networks (GNAs), actors can increasingly feed compromised data into enemy systems to negatively affect tactical performance or operational success. Competent armed forces will thus deploy intelligent machines only in so far as the risks, problems and constraints they face are, slowly and progressively, addressed.

This brings us to a final consideration. In order to address these very risks, problems and constraints, investments in a broad range of fields are also needed so as to counterbalance investments by enemies and adversaries. Improving all the underlying technologies related to AI, ML and BD, learning about their potential, integrating them into existing military platforms and exploiting them for maximum strategic, operational or tactical effectiveness require time, human capital, institutional backing, technological competence and financial resources. In other words, the idea that countries can quickly exploit the technologies of the fourth Industrial Revolution for building military power seems exaggerated.10

#### Heg doesn’t create peace.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy>)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.

The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.

Americans have always combined that feeling of divine providence with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and battle evil wherever it lurks. It is that sense of destiny, of being the object of history’s call, that most obviously separates the United States from other countries. Only an American president would claim that by entering World War I, “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.“46

Although many states are motivated by humanitarian causes, no other seems to consider promoting its values to be a national duty in quite the same way that Americans do. “I believe that God wants everybody to be free,” said George W. Bush in 2004. “That’s what I believe. And that’s one part of my foreign policy.“47 When Madeleine Albright called the United States the “indispensable nation,” she was reflecting a traditional, deeply held belief of the American people.48 Exceptional nations, like exceptional people, have an obligation to assist the merely average.

Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

#### Primacy in Asia is unsustainable and causes miscalc.

Shifrinson 21, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. (Joshua R. Itzkowitz, Winter 2021, “Neo-Primacy and the Pitfalls of US Strategy toward China”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 43:4, 89-90)

It Is Difficult to Stop China’s Continued Rise

Second, neo-primacy’s logic rests on shaky foundations, as the United States’ opportunity to reclaim preeminence is extremely small, and the effort will likely prove both counterproductive and dangerous. Baldly, if the United States was unable to keep China from becoming a near-peer competitor in the first place via classic primacy, it is even less likely that the United States has the wherewithal to put the Chinese genie back in the bottle and now push China from the great power ranks via neo-primacy.

States generally balance when confronted with a direct external threat. This tendency is significant in the US-China context because, under neo-primacy, the United States would effectively declare itself a direct threat to China at a time when US analysts acknowledge China has a growing capacity to oppose American plans and ambitions.53 Though China is not poised to dominate East Asia, it can thus be expected to devote its own considerable resources toward keeping pace with US efforts to arrest China’s rise and/or shift the relative distribution of power in the US favor. The odds of major crises would then increase as Washington and Beijing maneuver for position, in turn raising the odds of escalatory spirals, miscalculation, and war.

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Trends in military spending and recent economic developments suggest China’s capacity to oppose neo-primacy and a US drive to reclaim untrammeled preeminence. On one level, China currently devotes a smaller share of its economic wealth to military purposes than the United States, yet it has still managed to reduce American military advantages. This implies that Beijing could do quite a bit to frustrate American policy simply by allocating more to international purposes; if the United States feels pressured by a China that spends 2 percent of its GDP on defense, a China that spends 3 or 4 percent of GDP on defense—roughly what the United States has spent since the Cold War—would present a still larger problem and place the United States in an even worse position.55

Nor is it just military spending that underlines neo-primacy’s limitations. After all, ongoing efforts to decouple the US and Chinese economies—designed partly to limit Chinese growth—has pushed Beijing toward fostering a self-sustaining domestic economy able to withstand “sustained acrimony with the United States.” Given this, it is reasonable to infer that additional economic efforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing Chinese responses.56 Considering, too, that China’s economy has grown at a faster rate than the United States’ (even during COVID-19) and that the country has worked to narrow the USChina technological gap,57 the PRC’s ability to keep pace with the United States cannot be discounted.58 Shifts in the distribution of power since the Cold War make neo-primacy self-defeating by enabling China to match US efforts while risking US national security along the way. In this sense, neoprimacy risks exacerbating the very problem it seeks to address.

#### Courts circumvent.

Newman 19, University of Miami School of Law professor and a former attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division. (John, 4-5-2019, "What Democratic Contenders Are Missing in the Race to Revive Antitrust", *Atlantic*, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/what-2020-democratic-candidates-miss-about-antitrust/586135/)

But the federal courts represent a massive stumbling block for any progressive antitrust movement. Reformers have identified two paths forward; both lead eventually to the court system. The first is relatively moderate: appoint regulators who will actually enforce the laws already on the books. Warren’s plan rests in part on this straightforward idea. The second, more audacious path requires congressional action to amend and strengthen our current laws. Warren’s call for a new ban on technology companies’ buying and selling via their own platforms falls into this category. Klobuchar has also proposed new antitrust legislation that would make it easier to block harmful mergers and acquisitions. But no matter its content, enforcing a law requires persuading a judge. When it comes to U.S. antitrust laws, federal judges—not Congress, and not regulatory agencies—are the ultimate arbiters. The Department of Justice Antitrust Division, one of our two public enforcement agencies, files all its cases in federal courts. And although the Federal Trade Commission (the other) can decide cases internally, the inevitable appeals eventually end up in court as well. No matter how strongly worded a law may be, ideologically driven judges can usually find a way around enforcing it. The cyclical history of U.S. antitrust law is proof that judges wield nearly limitless institutional power in this area. Soon after Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890, a conservative Supreme Court began to chip away at its effectiveness. Congress reacted in 1914 with the Clayton Act, which sought to ban anticompetitive mergers. In 1936, at the height of the New Deal era, Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits price discrimination (charging different prices to different buyers for the same product). These laws were actively enforced for decades. But starting in the late 1970s, conservative judges began to erode the Clayton Act. Today, megamergers among competitors such as Bayer and Monsanto barely raise eyebrows. So-called vertical mergers, which combine suppliers and their customers, are now all but immune from antitrust enforcement—see the DOJ’s failed challenge to AT&T and Time Warner’s recent tie-up. Under the business-friendly Roberts Court, the Robinson-Patman Act has similarly been eviscerated. By the 2000s, the ideas of the conservative Chicago School had become mainstream in antitrust circles. Robinson-Patman, a law intended to protect small businesses, was an easy target for Chicago School critics narrowly focused on efficiency and low consumer prices. Their attacks found a receptive audience in the federal judiciary. Among insiders, Robinson-Patman is now known as “zombie law.” It remains on the books, but regulators no longer bother trying to enforce it. If Democrats want to change antitrust law, they will first and foremost need to change the judges who apply it. Yet none of the 2020 contenders championing antitrust reform have even mentioned the possibility of appointing progressive antitrust thinkers to the bench. Conservatives, on the other hand, have long recognized the centrality of antitrust to broader questions about the apportionment of power in society. In his seminal work, The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork called antitrust a “microcosm in which larger movements of our society are reflected.” Battles fought in this arena, Bork wrote, “are likely to affect the outcome of parallel struggles in others.” Strong antitrust enforcement keeps powerful monopolies in check. Toothless antitrust allows the unlimited accumulation of corporate power. Recognizing the high stakes, the Republican Party has gone to great lengths to appoint conservative antitrust experts to the federal judiciary. Bork was an antitrust professor at Yale Law School before becoming an appellate judge in 1982.\* Frank Easterbrook practiced and taught antitrust before donning the black robe in 1985. Douglas Ginsburg served as the head of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division before he became a federal judge in 1986. None of the three managed to join the Supreme Court, but not for lack of trying. Reagan nominated both Bork and Ginsburg to serve as justices, though Ginsburg withdrew and Bork was famously rejected after a contentious Senate hearing. And whom did the GOP select as its very first U.S. Supreme Court nominee during the Trump Administration? None other than Neil Gorsuch, who practiced antitrust law for more than a decade before joining the Tenth Circuit. Even as a judge, Gorsuch continued to teach a law-school course on antitrust until his confirmation to the Supreme Court in 2017. Once upon a time, progressives demonstrated similar concern about judicial treatment of antitrust laws. Justice Stephen Breyer, for example, served as special assistant to the head of the DOJ Antitrust Division before his judicial appointment by President Jimmy Carter. Earlier still, Justice John Paul Stevens was an antitrust lawyer, scholar, and professor before his appointment to the bench. Today’s Democratic 2020 hopefuls seem to have forgotten the lessons of history. Their antitrust proposals focus exclusively on appointing the right regulators and amending our current statutes. These are right-minded ideas, but they overlook the central role judges play in our political system. There is an old saying in the legal community: “Hard cases make bad law.” That may be true, but it is just as often the case that bad judges make bad law. Real antitrust reform will require more than regulatory and legislative tweaks; it will require the right judges.

### 1NC---Solvency---Courts

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## ADVANTAGE TWO

### 1NC---Turn---Horsetrading

#### Plan only passes after it’s horse-traded with Republicans for censorship prohibitions---turns the case.

Perera 21, veteran cybersecurity reporter, Data security & privacy reporter for MLex (Dave, 3-12-2021, “US antitrust legislation faces uphill battle despite unified Democratic government,” <https://mlexmarketinsight.com/news-hub/editors-picks/area-of-expertise/antitrust/us-antitrust-legislation-faces-uphill-battle-despite-unified-democratic-government>)

Renewed interest among US lawmakers in antitrust legislation is unlikely to produce radical policy shifts, notwithstanding the Democratic Party’s unified control of the federal government. Democrats promised a “big, bold agenda” after they captured the Senate by a hairsbreadth in January. Democratic lawmakers may very well stick to those ambitions and announce audacious legislative proposals. But the fate of those bills is at the mercy of a political dynamic ensuring that the more liberal the policy prescriptions, the less likely they are to become law. The most likely outcome over the next two years is more funding for enforcers at the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, whether directly through appropriated funds, steeper merger notification filing fees, or both. It’s also possible Congress could incrementally tinker along the edges of antitrust. It might lower the threshold for challenging mergers, or mandate data portability requirements for social media companies. Those expecting — or fearing — more ambitious outcomes likely won’t see them enacted. So until America’s November 2022 election, scratch from the list of high probabilities reforms such as requiring dominant firms to separate lines of business, or shifting the burden of proof onto an acquiring company. Put another way, unless a bill can attract significant Republican support, not even two years of unified Democratic government can guarantee reforms. — American exceptionalism — Single party control of both congressional chambers and the presidency is relatively rare in American politics. It has occurred in fewer than a third of legislative sessions since 1980. When it strikes, it doesn’t last long — typically just the two years between one congressional election and another. Historically, unified control is a fertile period for new regulations. President George W. Bush overhauled Medicare. President Barack Obama ushered in financial sector reforms and the Affordable Care Act. Indications are that President Joe Biden is emboldened by his party’s last-minute capture of the Senate. History, of course, isn’t a blueprint. Even a brief look at past episodes of unified control reveals that not even single-party capture of the executive and legislative branches of the US government can assure the enactment of a partisan agenda. For one thing, neither political party is a monolith. Although far more politically aligned than when Democratic conservatives found common cause in the 20th century with Republicans, the major American parties nonetheless are coalitions of centrist and activist wings. For Democrats, the tensions inherent in appeasing all sides became apparent earlier this month when centrists trimmed benefits in the $1.9 trillion coronavirus stimulus package. Neither is single party grip on power secure unless it commands an overwhelming majority in the Senate, thanks to a uniquely American institution: the filibuster. In the Senate, the rules mandate a three-fifths vote before debate over a bill is cut off. In recent decades, it’s become a weapon routinely wielded by the minority party to kill legislation. The upshot is that policy legislation needs supermajority support before it can proceed, meaning the 50 Democrats of today’s Senate have little choice but to resign themselves to the grind of finding Republican supporters. There are limited exceptions. Assuming Democrats stay in unison, they don’t need Republican votes to appoint judges, approve executive branch nominations or pass fiscal legislation such as the coronavirus stimulus that just became law. It’s within Democrats’ power to abolish the filibuster, but for now, the maneuver appears safe. Asked just days ago about the matter, White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki told reporters that the president’s preference is for it to stay in place. “The president is an optimist by nature,” Psaki added. — Hunting for bipartisan consensus — Not every bill introduced in Congress, nor even every bill approved by a committee or even an entire single chamber, makes it through the process because its sponsors believe it’ll become law. There are a host of bills drafted with the intent of sending a message to industry, to independent regulators, to donors, to constituents. There are bills that lawmakers view as setting out a position to influence an ongoing policy debate. Even if it won’t become law this year, it might the next year, or the next, reintroduced and refined along the way. Telltale signs of whether a bill is a serious attempt at law are the number of cosponsors, and whether that list of names includes members of both parties in good stead with their party’s leadership. Bipartisan support is important even in the House, where Democrats have the votes to completely bypass Republicans. Because the House doesn’t have the filibuster to contend with, those with the majority of seats control the chamber. House Democrats can and do pass bills in the face of absolute House Republican opposition, but — special exceptions for fiscal bills aside — those bills are dead on arrival in the Senate. As long as the filibuster exists or Democrats lack a Senate supermajority, the House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee must court Republican support if its intention is to make new law. Finding clues of what House Democrats might seriously achieve, then, may be little more difficult than looking up the policy prescriptions House Republicans favor: giving regulators more resources, shifting the burden of proof in merger cases and boosting data portability and interoperability. A report issued by now-ranking Republican Ken Buck as a rejoinder to last year’s Democratic House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee staff report on competition in digital markets allowed that the GOP shares other Democratic concerns, including predatory pricing, monopoly leveraging and control over marketplace platforms. That conciliatory signal also came weighted, with warnings that Congress should be wary of “handing additional regulatory to agencies in an attempt to micromanage.” Instead, try instead telling enforcers they should return to first principles, the Colorado lawmaker advised. Whether Republicans and Democrats in the Senate can find common cause is an even more fraught question. Unlike its House counterpart, the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on antitrust hasn't conducted a 16-month investigation into digital monopolization. The subcommittee’s senior Republican, Utah’s Mike Lee, is prone to touting the importance of the consumer welfare standard and rails against online platforms “eager to impose the ideological censorship called for by their political benefactors.” Lee also says he’s open to working with subcommittee Chairwoman Amy Klobuchar on strengthening enforcement, adding the caveat that current antitrust laws are sufficient. Klobuchar, a Minnesota Democrat, doesn’t need Lee to get a bill through her subcommittee, but failing to find consensus with Republicans imperils her chances of making law. The prospects for her Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act becoming law as current written aren't good. — 'Big tech is out to get conservatives' — A looming question hanging over any bill, even one tailored to win bipartisan support, is whether it could be derailed by Republican anger at online platforms for alleged anti-conservative bias. A right-wing trope especially spread by President Donald Trump during his last year in office — the belief that platforms use their content moderation powers to silence conservatives — has mainstream acceptance in Republican circles. It’s a refrain almost obligatory for Republican lawmakers to repeat when discussing any issue related to online platforms. “Big tech is out to get conservatives,” House Judiciary Committee ranking member Jim Jordan of Ohio has said more than once. Democrats have their own share of anger at online platforms’ content-moderation practices, to be sure. They accuse online platforms of circumventing consumer protections, undermining civil rights laws and not doing enough to stymie disinformation. It’s Republicans, though, who appear the angriest, and are the more likely to insist that any legislative reform touching online platforms address content moderation, with the intention of making it harder, not easier, for online platforms to remove users, potentially imperiling a compromise measure.

#### That cements white nationalism.

Devich-Cyril 21, activist, a writer, and a public speaker on the issues of digital rights, narrative power, Black liberation, and collective grief. Devich-Cyril is also a Senior Fellow at MediaJustice and the organization’s founding executive director (Malkia, “Banning White Supremacy Isn’t Censorship, It’s Accountability,” Wired, https://www.wired.com/story/banning-white-supremacy-censorship-accountability/)

When big tech allows white hate speech to go unfettered, it not only bolsters white supremacist violence but echoes real world racial inequities that privilege white communities and depress Black wealth, mortality, and quality of life. As we’ve seen, when white nationalist speech and racist conditions comingle, they operate together and become part of the status quo, adopted by some government officials, law enforcement, members of the military and more. In a nation fractured by white supremacy and other forms of inequality, democracy is called to double duty—it must distribute political freedoms like those offered in the First Amendment while simultaneously ensuring civil rights which extend equal protection to all. This is no easy task, especially in the age of algorithmic decisionmaking, digital economies, and loosely regulated and vastly profitable media platforms.

### 1NC---Advantage 2

#### Can’t solve misinformation---Parler proves new platforms don’t dampen conservative propaganda.

#### Solvency takes decades, and big firms rebound.

1AC Fukuyama et al. 21, \*Francis, Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. \*\*Barak Richman, Katharine T. Bartlett Professor of Law and Professor of Business Administration at Duke University School of Law. \*\*\*Ashish Goel, Professor of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University. They are members of the Working Group on Platform Scale for Stanford University’s Program on Democracy and the Internet. (January/February 2021, "How to Save Democracy From Technology", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-11-24/fukuyama-how-save-democracy-technology)

Another approach to checking Internet platforms’ power is to promote greater competition. If there were a multiplicity of platforms, none would have the dominance enjoyed by Facebook and Google today. The problem, however, is that neither the United States nor the EU could likely break up Facebook or Google the way that Standard Oil and AT&T were broken up. Today’s technology companies would fiercely resist such an attempt, and even if they eventually lost, the process of breaking them up would take years, if not decades, to complete. Perhaps more important, it is not clear that breaking up Facebook, for example, would solve the underlying problem. There is a very good chance that a baby Facebook created by such a breakup would quickly grow to replace the parent. Even AT&T regained its dominance after being broken up in the 1980s. Social media’s rapid scalability would make that happen even faster.

#### No disinfo impact.

Ewing 20, Citing Keir Giles, a Russia specialist with the Conflict Studies Research Centre in the United Kingdom and Tim Hwang, director of the Harvard-MIT Ethics and Governance of AI Initiative. (Philip, 5-7-2020, “Why Fake Video, Audio May Not Be As Powerful In Spreading Disinformation As Feared”, *NPR*, https://www.npr.org/2020/05/07/851689645/why-fake-video-audio-may-not-be-as-powerful-in-spreading-disinformation-as-feare)

Sophisticated fake media hasn't emerged as a factor in the disinformation wars in the ways once feared — and two specialists say it may have missed its moment. Deceptive video and audio recordings, often nicknamed “deepfakes,” have been the subject of sustained attention by legislators and technologists, but so far have not been employed to decisive effect, said two panelists at a video conference convened on Wednesday by NATO. One speaker borrowed Sherlock Holmes' reasoning about the significance of something that didn't happen. “We've already passed the stage at which they would have been most effective,” said Keir Giles, a Russia specialist with the Conflict Studies Research Centre in the United Kingdom. “They're the dog that never barked.” The perils of deepfakes in political interference have been discussed too often and many people have become too familiar with them, Giles said during the online discussion, hosted by NATO's Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Following all the reports and revelations about election interference in the West since 2016, citizens know too much to be hoodwinked in the way a fake video might once have fooled large numbers of people, he argued: “They no longer have the power to shock.” Tim Hwang, director of the Harvard-MIT Ethics and Governance of AI Initiative, agreed that deepfakes haven't proven as dangerous as once feared, although for different reasons. Hwang argued that users of “active measures” (efforts to sow misinformation and influence public opinion) can be much more effective with cheaper, simpler and just as devious types of fakes — mis-captioning a photo or turning it into a meme, for example. Influence specialists working for Russia and other governments also imitate Americans on Facebook, for another example, worming their way into real Americans' political activities to amplify disagreements or, in some cases, try to persuade people not to vote. Other researchers have suggested this work continues on social networks and has become more difficult to detect. Defense is stronger than attack Hwang also observed that the more deepfakes are made, the better machine learning becomes at detecting them. A very sophisticated, real-looking fake video might still be effective in a political context, he acknowledged — and at a cost to create of around $10,000, it would be easily within the means of a government's active measures specialists. But the risks of attempting a major disruption with such a video may outweigh an adversary's desire to use one. People may be too media literate, as Giles argued, and the technology to detect a fake may mean it can be deflated too swiftly to have an effect, as Hwang said. “I tend to be skeptical these will have a large-scale impact over time,” he said. One technology boss told NPR in an interview last year that years' worth of work on corporate fraud protection systems has given an edge to detecting fake media.” This is not a static field. Obviously, on our end we've performed all sorts of great advances over this year in advancing our technology, but these synthetic voices are advancing at a rapid pace,” said Brett Beranek, head of security business for the technology firm Nuance. “So we need to keep up.” Beranek described how systems developed to detect telephone fraudsters could be applied to verify the speech in a fake clip of video or audio. Corporate clients that rely on telephone voice systems must be wary about people attempting to pose as others with artificial or disguised voices. Beranek's company sells a product that helps to detect them, and that countermeasure also works well in detecting fake audio or video. Machines using neural networks can detect known types of synthetic voices. Nuance also says it can analyze a recording of a real, known voice — say, that of a politician — and then contrast its characteristics against a suspicious recording. Although the world of cybersecurity is often described as one in which attackers generally have an edge over defenders, Beranek said he thought the inverse was true in terms of this kind of fraud detection.” For the technology today, the defense side is significantly ahead of the attack side,” he said. Shaping the battlefield Hwang and Giles acknowledged in the NATO video conference that deepfakes likely will proliferate and become lower in cost to create, perhaps becoming simple enough to make with a smartphone app. One prospective response is the creation of more of what Hwang called “radioactive data” — material earmarked in advance so that it might make a fake easier to detect. If images of a political figure were so tagged beforehand, they could be spotted quickly if they were incorporated by computers into a deceptive video. Also, the sheer popularity of new fakes, if that is what happens, might make them less valuable as a disinformation weapon. More people could become more familiar with them, as well as being detectable by automated systems — plus they may also have no popular medium on which to spread. Big social media platforms already have declared affirmatively that they'll take down deceptive fakes, Hwang observed. “That might make it more difficult for a scenario in which a politically charged fake video goes viral just before Election Day. “Although it might get easier and easier to create deepfakes, a lot of the places where they might spread most effectively, your Facebooks and Twitters of the world, are getting a lot more aggressive about taking them down,” Hwang said. That won't stop them, but it might mean they'll be relegated to sites with too few users to have a major effect, he said. “They'll percolate in these more shady areas.

#### Democracy doesn’t solve war.

Campbell et al. 18, \*Doctoral Candidate in Political Science, Ohio State University. \*\*Carter Phillips and Sue Henry Associate Professor of Political Science at the Ohio State University. \*\*\*Associate Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. (\*Benjamin W., \*\*Skyler J. Cranmer, \*\*\*Bruce A. Desmarais, September 13, 2018, “Triangulating War: Network Structure and the Democratic Peace”, *Cornell University*, Accessible at: <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.04141.pdf>)

Conclusion

The dyadic understanding of the democratic peace has become ubiquitous in International Relations. By looking beyond simple dyadic analysis, accounting for the embededness of states in a much more complex network, we found the democratic peace may not be as robust as previously thought. Our results demonstrate that after accounting for the tendency for like-regime states with common enemies not to fight one another, the effect of the democratic peace not only vanishes, but jointly democratic dyads seem to be *more* conflict prone than mixed dyads. These results are consistent across operationalizations of the outcome variable, our triadic closure predictor, measurements of joint democracy, and a variety of other factors. We believe this explanation for the democratic peace is not a mechanism for understanding the democratic peace, but instead, an alternative. What we have shown here is that conflict between democracies indeed exists and the peaceful relations occasionally found are not necessarily a function of the affinity of democratic states, or intrinsic attributes of democratic states, but instead, a function of the strategic inefficiencies of fighting a state with a shared enemy. While regime type may influence the interests of states, we find that it does not directly influence the probability that any two states fight one another.

There are three major implications to our research. First, scholars should be hesitant to consider dyadic conflict in isolation, as there are network dependencies informing whether a state engages or joins a MID. Second, preferences operating in addition to network interdependencies and collaboration explain much of the democratic peace. Third, when studying conflict, scholars and practitioners should consider the cost structure of collaboration, and how these dynamics inform not only conflict initiation, but conflict escalation. Particularly interesting is that the theoretical mechanism at work here is dramatically simpler than any of the established justifications for the democratic peace. We do not rely on arguments about institutions or norms, but just the simple and intuitive proposition that it does not make much sense for two states fighting a third to also fight each other. What the existing literature seems to have missed, usually theoretically and almost always empirically, is that dyadic conflicts do not occur in isolation, but in the context of a complex network of relations.

#### **Insurrection thumps.**

Faiola et al. 21, \*Anthony, The Washington Post’s South America/Caribbean bureau chief. \*\*Shibani Mahtani, the Southeast Asia bureau chief for The Washington Post, covering countries that include the Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia. \*\*\*Isabelle Khurshudyan, foreign correspondent based in Moscow. (1-14-2021, "A siege on the U.S. Capitol, a strike against democracy worldwide", *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/trump-capitol-attack-democracy-abroad/2021/01/12/5b544e3e-5135-11eb-a1f5-fdaf28cfca90_story.html>)

The attempted insurrection at the Capitol is threatening America’s historical role of promoting democracy around the world. The spectacle of Trump rallying supporters to march on the Capitol over baseless claims of election fraud as lawmakers certified President-elect Joe Biden’s victory has provided a propaganda coup for Washington’s enemies, undermined pro-democracy movements worldwide and offered a model for would-be autocrats. Four years of Trump had already dimmed the United States’ democratic bona fides. The 45th president embraced right-wing nationalists who flouted the rule of law, while backing a handful of pro-democracy movements that served expedient political purposes. A chorus of “no” went up against Venezuela, Cuba and Iran. But from Egypt to Honduras to Saudi Arabia to North Korea, Trump signaled tolerance for human rights abuses and offered authoritarians a new way to dismiss accountability by popularizing the term “fake news.” When asked in September about the alleged Russian poisoning of opposition figure Alexei Navalny, Trump essentially demurred. The House voted Wednesday to impeach Trump for inciting the riot at the Capitol. The Senate will hold a trial, and could bar him from returning to the presidency. But the international implications of the events in Washington last week — and its racial undertones that led the Times of India to dub its pro-Trump participants the “Coup Klux Clan” — are expected to reverberate far beyond Biden’s inauguration. “I think we will get through this, but our credibility as an example of governance is pretty seriously tarnished,” said Ian Kelly, the U.S. ambassador to Georgia from 2015 to 2018. “Let’s not forget that Trump had many enablers, and they’re still there … This president has reduced the coin of our realm.” The State Department said the events of Jan. 6 showed “once again that there is a right way and a wrong way for the citizens of a democracy to express themselves,” but did “not in any way diminish the power of our democratic history and the principles that we strive toward.” “Our democracy has been tested in the past, and it will be tested in the future,” the department said in a statement to The Washington Post. “These experiences make us stronger as we work to perfect our union and our democracy. That we are tested, however, should never cause anyone — allies, friends, or foes — to doubt the strength of America’s democratic institutions or our people.” The White House did not respond to a request for comment. The world’s populists are losing their White House ally, but global Trumpism is far from over Analysts now warn of a herculean task ahead for Biden. Global inequality, historic migration and deep polarization have driven satisfaction with democracy to disturbing lows. Biden could be weakened by the millions of Trump voters who still say his victory was illegitimate, giving adversaries such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin an opening to assail his mandate on the world stage. Meanwhile, any attempt to preach the rule of law to Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan or Hungary’s Viktor Orban could draw calls for him to get his own house in order first. U.S. democracy promotion abroad has long faced accusations of hypocrisy. During the Cold War, Washington routinely coddled strongmen who pledged to oppose communism. Yet last week’s siege is likely to amplify accusations of a double standard, haunting U.S. diplomats and human rights activists as they press for the rule of law abroad. “A lot depends on what happens next,” said Jo-Marie Burt, an associate professor of political science at George Mason University. “If you’re going to allow impunity [in the United States], then that hurts the American experiment. Without accountability at home, we’re going down a path of saying, you know, stuff happens.” The copycat risk In Israel, some observers fear that the Trump model of insurrection, fueled by baseless conspiracy theories, could push the country’s own volatile politics toward a dangerous tipping point. In a country bitterly split by an ideological divide that has paralyzed the government for more than two years, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has emulated Trump, railing against “fake news”

and decrying a “witch hunt” by prosecutors and courts trying him on corruption charges. Netanyahu, a close Trump ally, waited until a day after news organizations called Biden’s election victory to congratulate him, and lagged behind other Israeli politicians in condemning the riot at the Capitol last week. “The reason what happened at the Capitol can happen here is because we already have all the same ingredients,” Yaakov Katz, editor in chief of the Jerusalem Post, wrote in a commentary. “That is what happens when democracy — its values and its institutions — are consistently and systematically attacked, eroded and dismantled. Violence is a potential next step.” A propaganda coup Middle Eastern adversaries like Iran have seized on the chaos at the Capitol as evidence that U.S. democracy is deeply flawed. Allies such as the Gulf Arab monarchies will miss Trump, who declined to criticize their human rights abuses. Though they will seek close ties with a Biden administration, they now have an argument with which to dismiss U.S. advice on democracy. “It’s clear your democracy is in shambles, so please don’t come over here and lecture us,” said Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a political science professor in Dubai. Belarusian strongman Alexander Lukashenko moved swiftly to spin last week’s events to his advantage. Lukashenko, in power since 1994, claimed a landslide victory for a sixth term last year in an election denounced by the United States and other countries as fraudulent. Belarus has been rocked since then by mass protests calling for his resignation. “I warned you: It’s bad when they walk down the street,” Lukashenko said after the Capitol siege. “It’s even worse when they walk into the courtyards. It will be unbearable when they come to your apartments.” Marina El Fadel, a 37-year-old protester who was stunned by the siege in Washington, sought to distance it from the peaceful demonstrations in Minsk. “I had no illusions about Trump and his policies, so the storming of the Capitol did not affect my attitude on America as a democracy,” she said. “It is a pity for the people who suffer because of the wrong policy of their president. That’s where we’re similar.” In China, the Capitol siege has provided a boost to the ruling Communist Party, which has long warned citizens that democracy is a recipe for chaos. “Chinese state media is already proclaiming the riots in Washington as the failure of democracy,” said Deng Yuwen, a former editor of a party newspaper. “This is a huge help to the Communist Party’s legitimacy.” China is having a field day with U.S. Capitol chaos State media concluded that U.S. democracy was “bankrupt” and “an embarrassment.” The People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, ridiculed what it described as America’s false sense of superiority amid years of attempting to export the model. “The gunshots at the U.S. Capitol make clear that the bitter fruit of ‘democracy’ must be swallowed by the one who sowed it,” the newspaper said. “Whether it is bitter or sweet, they will know.” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying ­likened the mob in Washington to pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong, which Beijing routinely described as “rioters.” Hua said she had “made a note” of the words U.S. officials and media used to describe the Capitol siege. “They all condemned it as ‘a violent incident’ and the people involved as ‘rioters,’ ‘extremists’ and ‘thugs’ who brought “disgrace,’ ” Hua said. Yet the protesters in Hong Kong were “democratic heroes.” “What’s the reason for such a stark difference in the choice of words?” she said. “Everyone needs to seriously think about it and do some soul-searching.” For pro-democracy movements, a bitter pill Indeed, analysts say the attempted insurrection has reduced Washington’s moral authority to back pro-democracy movements from Hong Kong to Caracas, Venezuela — some of which enjoyed the strong support of Republicans. Two of the Hong Kong activists’ greatest advocates were Sens. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) and Josh Hawley (R-Mo.). Both men traveled to Hong Kong at the height of the protests to advocate democracy and became leading voices for sanctions against Chinese officials and their allies in Hong Kong. Their votes last week against certifying Biden’s win, and Hawley’s raised fist to the demonstrators outside the Capitol before they entered, have provided Beijing with an opening to rail against U.S. hypocrisy. “Aligning with some of these folks is going to be a lot more contentious moving forward,” said historian Jeffrey Ngo, a pro-democracy activist who has spent significant time lobbying Washington for support. Cruz’s office said the senator had merely called for “electoral integrity and democratic credibility.” “No one outside of the Establishment media and some Democrats believes that undermined America’s credibility on deliberation, elections, and democracy,” the office said in a statement. Hawley’s office did not respond to a request for comment. “The Trump years have made it difficult for pro-democracy activists to create alliances because people look to the president, and no matter who he is, he has tremendous power,” Ngo said. “After this week, it has become even more difficult.” The Trump administration this week added Cuba to the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. In the Cuban and Venezuelan exile communities of South Florida, Trump’s actions last week deepened the divide between conservatives — some of whom held rallies in favor of Trump’s efforts to overturn the election — and liberals, who argued that they echoed the abuses that they or their families had fled. Trump “ceded moral authority to speak on domestic matters in another country, and that’s what’s so dangerous,” said Ana Sofía Peláez, co-founder of the Miami Freedom Project. “We lose our own voice for democracy when we don’t value [it] in our own country.”

#### Antitrust won’t save democracy.

Howell 21, PhD candidate at Harvard University studying the history of technology, labor and business. (Jordan, 1-31-2021, "Breaking up Big Tech can’t save American democracy by itself", *Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/01/31/breaking-up-big-tech-cant-save-american-democracy-by-itself/)

Despite these divisions, there is a growing bipartisan consensus that antitrust law could save American democracy from Big Tech. Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) has led the charge from the right, accusing it of censoring conservatives, squelching competition and dissolving the American family. On the left, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) has argued that Big Tech needs to be broken up because it has “too much power over our economy, our society, and our democracy.” Are Hawley and Warren right?

A look at a prominent case of corporate regulation during the New Deal reminds us that antitrust is no panacea. In 1937, the Justice Department began antitrust action against Alcoa, a firm that one labor activist called a “masterpiece in monopoly.” Without a single competitor, Alcoa was the only game in town for aluminum production. While the antitrust case against Alcoa was initially dismissed, the government won its appeal in 1945, providing legislators with the power to bust the trust. Yet antitrust was only one of the tools New Dealers deployed to curb Alcoa’s power. What mattered more than antitrust was the idea of public utility, which stood at the heart of the New Deal regulatory state.

Why did this concept of public utility matter? The case against Alcoa was never just about aluminum. For New Dealers like Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, who called Alcoa “one of the worst monopolies that has ever been able to fasten itself upon American life,” it was about rivers. Per pound, aluminum production demanded roughly 10 times the energy as steel production. Since profits depended on cheap power, Alcoa built six dams on the Little Tennessee River during the first three decades of the 20th century to power its smelters at Baldwin, N.C., and Alcoa, Tenn. Alcoa had entered the hydropower business.

By the 1930s, however, many Americans believed river development was too important to be handed over to private interests. New Dealers promoted the re-engineering of the nation’s rivers as a means to stimulate the economy, tame private enterprise and shore up democracy. As William J. Novak has argued, this vision drew on a broad conception of public utility that legal scholars had developed during the Progressive Era. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), launched in 1933, was a paradigmatic example. But the idea of public utility never resonated with Alcoa’s executives, who saw the TVA as a cheap imitation of itself.

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 accelerated the tensions between Alcoa and the American state, as demand for aluminum to build warplanes promised to turn Alcoa into a veritable behemoth. During the war, no firm received more government funds to build factories than Alcoa.

New Dealers saw the explosion of demand for aluminum as an opportunity to bend the industry to their needs. During the war, planners at the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and the TVA ensured that federal funds turned into factories that would fit their vision for regional economic development. Above all, this meant wartime aluminum plants had to consume publicly generated hydroelectricity. Private aluminum production became a critical source of revenue for the TVA and BPA.

Wartime planners at regional power agencies — especially the BPA — believed the future of public power depended on a competitive aluminum industry. Samuel Moment, the economist who wrote the blueprint for the aluminum industry’s postwar reconstruction, had worked as a planner at the BPA in Portland since 1940. In 1945, the conclusion of the antitrust suit against Alcoa empowered the Surplus Property Board (SPB) — the agency in charge of selling off government-financed war production facilities — to implement Moment’s plan. The SPB sold government-funded smelters and refineries that had been operated by Alcoa to two new competitors — Reynolds Metals and Kaiser Aluminum.

But a competitive aluminum industry was never an end in itself for New Dealers. It was a means to ensure public control of the nation’s rivers, which they believed would preserve democracy and spark regional economic development.

It is important to reckon with the flaws in this vision of public utility. In the Northwest, dam building during the New Deal inundated the homes, fishing sites and lands of many Indigenous peoples, including the Spokane, Wasco and Colville Nations. Consider the Spokane Nation, whose land and fishing sites were submerged by the Grand Coulee Dam in the 1940s. Only in 2020, after eight decades of activism, did the Spokane Nation receive federal compensation. All too often, Americans have mobilized the concept of the public good to dispossess Indigenous peoples of their land and water.

Even so, the interplay between public utility and antitrust during the New Deal contains lessons for the digital age. After the attack on the Capitol, many have applauded Trump’s excommunication from social media. But if democracy is to survive, a coterie of corporate elites cannot make such consequential political decisions. A more competitive tech industry — the solution offered by antitrust — will simply enlarge the number of elites making these decisions, without solving the fundamental problem.

Antitrust worked against Alcoa because there was a political consensus that certain economic and social domains — like river development — were too important to society to be outsourced to private business. This vision is worth remembering. If antitrust enables the state to create competition, the concept of public utility allows the state to redraw the line between public and private. While it has become commonplace to think of data as the oil of the 21st century, democracy would be better served by thinking of it more like a river. Until our digital communications sphere belongs to the public, Big Tech will remain a threat to democracy.

# 2NC

## K

### 2NC---AT Extinction First

#### 3---white futurity---extinction’s non-unique, placing it in the future smooths over the ongoing Black apocalypse that coheres Anthropocene ethics.

Karera 19, assistant professor of philosophy and African American studies @ Wesleyan University. (Axelle, “Blackness and the Pitfalls of Anthropocene Ethics”, *Critical Philosophy of Race*, Volume 7, Issue 1, pg. 43-46)

In all their shocking glory, Summers’s remarks epitomize a pervading instrumentalization of black existence, which challenges much of the totalizing gestures of Anthropocene narratives. It is the logic intrinsic to these gestures that I have attempted to lay out thus far. Braidotti, Morton, Tuana, and even Colebrook in her incisive interventions, are unable to relinquish or effectively resist the homogenizing consequences of the discourse.42 Their respective ethical and critical prescriptions sidestep an engaged account of social antagonisms, and more specifically those enacted along racial lines. Instead, these are smoothed over and displaced in the name of an ethics of futurity grounded on a deeply naturalized variation of relationality—namely that all beings, insofar as they are earthly at least, are fundamentally interconnected and can (or must) only be perceived as such. This affirmation, as well as Braidotti’s own brand of vitalism, is not only symptomatic of a more entrenched form of historical amnesia concerning questions of culpability (i.e., how did we end up here and who is responsible). More perniciously, they appear to be yet another instantiation of Saidiya Hartman’s provocative claim that “the white bourgeois family can actually live with murder in order to reconstitute its domesticity.”43 In its most blatant form, Summers’s secret memo is precisely this! There is nothing sacrificial in his proposition; it is not about preserving the air quality that matters—so to speak—at the expense of Africans. Rather, Africa—and therefore blackness—remains the disposable trash container of the world par excellence; a case of instrumentalization in its most primitive execution. Under these conditions, one is thus pressed to inquire how can a global ethics of care44 be possible when fundamental questions of racial culpability are eluded in the name of a shortsighted conception of “becoming” and an aggrandized notion of ontological relationality—both of which remain unwilling to sustain engagements with their violent racial foundations. Indeed, in her critical essay evocatively titled “The Mattering of Black Lives: Octavia Butler’s Hyperempathy and the Promise of the New Materialism,” Diana Leong asserts that the “reduction and disavowal of race [. . .] is something of a structural necessity for the new materialisms.”45 In ways that significantly resonate with my own argument in this article, she contends that, in addition to being a discursive necessity, circumventing the race question in this discourse “enables an ethics of relation or affect that further legitimizes the reduction and dismissal of race.”46 In other words, as I have also maintained, the ontological realism that naturalizes this “hyper-ethics” of relationality can only be maintained by the concealment of systems of racial oppression.

Recall that the ethical dimension of Braidotti’s becoming-posthumanist strives for the actualization of a community-to-come unrestrained by “the guilt of ancestral communal violence, or the melancholia of unpayable ontological debts.”47 This suggests that posthumanist reconfigurations of subjectivity and its creative invention of a “future people” as solutions to our ecological demise, hinge on the forgetting of the atrocious making of “another people” by slavery and the responsibility such violent history bestows on the Western world. What remains at stake here, however, is not so much the general (and generic) recognition of the differential effects of our environmental crisis on vulnerable populations. The literature exists, and the work continues to be done.48 Rather, we must return to the structural conditions that facilitates and renders possible the “symptomatic desire to abandon race.”49

If indeed, as Leong forcefully argues, “Blackness [. . .] is the specter that haunts the Anthropocene and its possible futures,” it is imperative that we incisively revisit the conditions that make “blackened” life and death unregisterable and therefore un-grievable. And if indeed grievability and the imperative to survive constitute, as Colebrook suggests, the “we” of the Anthropocene, it behooves us to attend to those ungrievable lives for which even survival requires facing death. That is to say, those lives for which existence requires suicidal decisions such as deadly expeditions across the Mediterranean Sea, the Mexico-United States border, and the many “border-fortresses” of the EU. How can we possibly ascertain to possess an “adequate cartography of our real-life conditions,” when we continue to sidestep considering the precarity of “social practices of human embodiment,” which necessitate one to gamble with one’s own death in order to envisage the possibility of a future?50

Insofar as Tuana’s viscous porosity, Morton’s hyperobject, and Braidotti’s vitalist posthuman politics are mostly interested in giving an account of the ontological foundation of species entanglements, they cannot account for the violent foundational structures that make Summers’s indifference I mention above possible. In my opinion, this is the discursive gift that philosophical interventions in the study of anti-black racism have offered us in the past couple of decades, namely (and I quote Jared Sexton here): “A meditation on a poetics and politics of abjection wherein racial blackness operates as an asymptomtic approximation of that which disturbs every claim or formation of identity and difference as such.51 Unlike Braidotti, whose main concern is to reconfigure the boundaries of subjectivity so as to recompose, with a materialist politics of posthuman difference, a “missing people,” critical black philosophies interrogate the very foundation of becoming—of this “we” to come. In addition to its demystifying agenda, which unremittingly unsettles the self-aggrandizing gestures of Western theory, critical black philosophies consider black suffering to be a crucial site of interrogation. They question what it means to inhabit a structural position whereby by the black philosopher is always already forced to align herself with exclusionary terms in order to register antiblack violence as violence. They investigate, for instance, what using the general lexicon and terms of philosophy “insubordinately” entail for the black philosopher. What matters for this critical tradition is to assess the conditions of a world when blackness is, at last, understood to be a decisive organizing principle.

In his poignant essay “Onticide: Afro-Pessimism, Gay Nigger #1, and Surplus Violence,” Calvin Warren challenges us to think of those who fall “outside the cultural space of ethics, relationality, and the sacred.”52 In fact, he provides us with robust grounds to remain suspicious of the hasty impulses of an affirmative politics of life and relationality profoundly unequipped to recognize the mundane and persistent ways in which death and perhaps even extinction always already constitute existence for the “fungible” object/being. In this text, Warren returns to the brutal killing of Steen Keith Fenrich by his white stepfather. It is not the gruesome details surrounding Fenrich’s death that are at stake here; in the same ways the morbidly grandiose performances of anti-black violence across the globe do not necessarily hold explanatory power in and of themselves. Rather, Warren uses this story to show how the violent spectacularity of Fenrich’s death—its operation, protocols and structure - “indicate a certain ontological violation that preconditions physical injury.”53 This violence that shocks both in the simultaneity of its excessive gratuitousness and indiscriminate indifference, a violence that “exceeds the logics of utility,” to use Warren’s language, is indispensable for the constitution of the human self and necessary to maintain the coherence of its solipsistic contours and concomitant socio-political institutions.54

### 2NC---Heg Stuff

#### Pursuit not inevitable AND decline solves war.

MacDonald & Parent 18, \*PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. \*\*PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. (Paul K. and Joseph M., “Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment”, pg. 2-3, Published by *Cornell University Press*)

In this book, we argue that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Specifically, we make three main arguments. First, relative decline causes prompt, proportionate retrenchment because states seek strategic solvency. The international system is a competitive place, and great powers did not get to the top by being imprudent, irrational, or irresponsible. When their fortunes ebb, states tend to retain the virtues that made them great. In the face of decline, great powers have a good sense of their relative capability and tend not to give away more than they must. Expanding or maintaining grand strategic ambitions during decline incurs unsustainable burdens and incites unwinnable fights, so the faster states fall, the more they retrench. Great powers may choose to retrench in other circumstances as well, but they have an overriding incentive to do so when confronted by relative decline.

Second, the depth of relative decline shapes not only how much a state retrenches, but also which policies it adopts. The world is complex and cutthroat; leaders cannot glibly pull a policy off the shelf and expect desired outcomes. Because international politics is a self-help system, great powers prefer policies that rely less on the actions of allies and adversaries. For lack of a better term, we refer to these as domestic policies, which include reducing spending, restructuring forces, and reforming institutions—all to reallocate resources for more efficient uses. But international policies may also help, and they include redeploying forces, defusing flashpoints, and redistributing burdens—all to avoid costly conflicts and reinforce core strongpoints. The faster and deeper states fall, the more they are willing to rely on others to cushion their fall. Retrenchment is not a weapon but an arsenal that can be used in different amounts and combinations depending on conditions and the enemies faced.

Third, after depth, structural conditions are the most important factors shaping how great powers respond to relative decline. Four conditions catalyze the incentives for declining states to retrench. One is the declining state’s rank. States in the top rungs of the great power hierarchy have more resources and margin for error than those lower down, so there is less urgency for them to retrench. Another is the availability of allies. Where states can shift burdens to capable regional powers with similar preferences, retrenchment is less risky and difficult. Yet another is the interdependence of commitments. When states perceive commitments in one place as tightly linked to commitments elsewhere, pulling back becomes harder and less likely. The last catalyst is the calculus of conquest. If aggression pays, then retrenchment does not, and great powers will be loath to do it. The world is not just complex and cutthroat, it is also dynamic. No set of conditions is everlasting, and leaders must change with the times.

Empirically, this work aims to add value by being the first to study systematically all modern shifts in the great power pecking order. We find sixteen cases of relative decline since 1870, when reliable data for the great powers become available, and compare them to their non-declining counterparts across a variety of measures. To preview the findings, retrenchment is by far the most common response to relative decline, and declining powers behave differently from non-declining powers. States in decline are more likely to cut the size of their military forces and budgets and in extreme cases are more likely to form alliances. This does not, however, make them ripe for exploitation; declining states perform comparatively well in militarized disputes. Our headline finding, however, is that states that retrench recover their prior rank with some regularity, but those that fail to retrench never do. These results challenge theories of grand strategy and war, offer guidance to policymakers, and indicate overlooked paths to peace.

## ADVANTAGE ONE

### 1NC [2]---Innovation Thumpers

#### Confusion and technical deficits thump.

Kampmark 21, was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. (Binoy, 2-26-2021, "War Mongering for Artificial Intelligence", *International Policy Digest*, https://intpolicydigest.org/warmongering-for-artificial-intelligence/)

Internal changes are also suggested to ruffle a few feathers. The US State Department comes in for special mention as needing reforms. “There is currently no clear lead for emerging technology policy or diplomacy within the State Department, which hinders the Department’s ability to make strategic technology decisions.” Allies and partners were confused when approaching the State Department as to “which senior official would be their primary point of contact” for a range of topics, be they AI, quantum computing, 5G, biotechnology, or new emerging technologies.

Overall, the US government comes in for a battering, reproached for operating “at human speed not machine speed.” It was lagging relative to commercial development of AI. It suffered from “technical deficits that range from digital workforce shortages to inadequate acquisition policies, insufficient network architecture, and weak data practices.”

#### Immigration freezes wreck innovation---outweighs their internal.

Hao 20, artificial intelligence senior reporter for MIT Technology Review. (Karen, 6-26-2020, "Trump’s freeze on new visas could threaten US dominance in AI", *MIT Technology Review*, https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/26/1004520/trump-executive-order-h1b-visa-threatens-us-ai/)

Even before president Trump’s executive order on June 22, the US was already bucking global tech immigration trends. Over the past five years, as other countries have opened up their borders to highly skilled technical people, the US has maintained—and even restricted—its immigration policies, creating a bottleneck for meeting domestic demand for tech talent.Now Trump’s decision to suspend a variety of work visas has left many policy analysts worried about what it could mean for long-term US innovation. In particular, the suspension of the H-1B, a three-year work visa granted to foreign workers in specialty fields and one of the primary channels for highly skilled tech workers to join the US workforce, could impact US dominance in critical technologies such as AI. “America’s key competitors are going in a different direction,” says Tina Huang, a research analyst at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET). “Historically the US has relied on talent from elsewhere to fuel the country’s technological dominance, and its key competitor nations are aware of this.” It’s likely those competitors will now use this window of opportunity to double down on attracting talent away from the US, she says, by designing even more expedited and lenient immigration policies. Trump’s move to bar foreigners from working in the US is part of the administration’s broader push to keep US jobs for Americans. In the months leading up to the decision, senior White House advisor Stephen Miller argued that the economic downturn caused by the pandemic has only increased the need to stem the flow of immigration. But the argument assumes that for every foreign worker turned away, an American worker is capable of taking their place. While there exists some debate about whether this could be true for the tech industry at large, says Huang, it is definitely not for AI. In fact, the majority of the US’s wealth of AI talent comes from abroad. A recent analysis from the think tank MacroPolo found that 69% of AI researchers working at US institutions received their undergraduate degrees from outside the US. Two-thirds of graduate students in the US’s top AI-related PhD programs are also international, with roughly 80% of them staying five years after graduation. Even so, the US still suffers from an AI talent shortage, exacerbated by existing immigration policies without the latest restrictions. Anecdotally, US-based AI researchers have long lamented the impact of unfriendly visa limits on their pace of innovation. In February 2019, when president Trump signed an executive order to institute a national AI strategy, Oren Etzioni, the CEO of the research nonprofit Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence, argued in an op-ed that the move was critically missing a special visa program for AI experts. On Twitter, Ian Goodfellow, Apple’s director of machine learning, concurred: “My collaborators' visa restrictions have been one of the largest bottlenecks to our collective research productivity over the last few years,” he said. Trump’s executive order will likely only make this shortage worse. CSET estimates that at least 35% of H-1B holders have an AI-related degree, and nearly three-quarters work in computing-related fields. Though the Trump administration hasn’t indicated how long the current visa suspensions could last, it has already contributed to “a growing sense of instability,” Zachary Arnold, a research fellow at CSET, says. As a result, more foreign nationals could choose not to bring their talents to the US because of uncertainty surrounding their ability to stay. Where would they go instead? In their latest report Huang and Arnold identified Canada, the UK, France, and Australia as the US’s top competitors for AI talent. All four have declared an intent to build their national AI capacity and adopted or proposed major immigration reforms to attract more AI workers in the last five years. In contrast to the US’s annual cap of 85,000 H-1B visas and seven-month to one-year application processing times, none of them have caps or wait times more than three months. Huang and Arnold worry that the US’s short-sightedness in immigration policy could have lasting repercussions for the country. “Talent is a foundational input to AI,” Arnold says. “It’s the fundamental resource that drives everything else.” Thus if the US wants to maintain its competitiveness, it needs to exempt AI talent from current visa caps and create clear pathways for those individuals to maintain permanent residency. But should the US continue in the direction of Trump’s executive order, Canada, in particular, is patiently waiting with open arms. In Silicon Valley, the Canadian government has paid for billboards that pointedly read “H-1B Problems? Pivot to Canada.”

### 1NC [3]---!D---Emerging Tech

#### No emerging tech impact.

Sechser et al. 19, \*Todd S., Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds, Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Virginia and Senior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, \*\*Neil Narang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, \*\*\*Caitlin Talmadge, Associate Professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign at Georgetown University. ( “Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 42:6, pg. 728-729)

Yet the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism. Extrapolating from current technological trends is problematic, both because technologies often do not live up to their promise, and because technologies often have countervailing or conditional effects that can temper their negative consequences. Thus, the fear that emerging technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution. There are at least two reasons to be circumspect.

First, very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics of international conflict. Historically, most technological innovations have amounted to incremental advancements, and some have disappeared into irrelevance despite widespread hype about their promise. For example, the introduction of chemical weapons was widely expected to immediately change the nature of warfare and deterrence after the British army first used poison gas on the battlefield during World War I. Yet chemical weapons quickly turned out to be less practical, easier to counter, and less effective than conventional high-explosives in inflicting damage and disrupting enemy operations.6 Other technologies have become important only after advancements in other areas allowed them to reach their full potential: until armies developed tactics for effectively employing firearms, for instance, these weapons had little effect on the balance of power. And even when technologies do have significant strategic consequences, they often take decades to emerge, as the invention of airplanes and tanks illustrates. In short, it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nascent technologies.7

Second, even if today’s emerging technologies are poised to drive important changes in the international system, they are likely to have variegated and even contradictory effects. Technologies may be destabilising under some conditions, but stabilising in others. Furthermore, other factors are likely to mediate the effects of new technologies on the international system, including geography, the distribution of material power, military strategy, domestic and organisational politics, and social and cultural variables, to name only a few.8 Consequently, the strategic effects of new technologies often defy simple classification. Indeed, more than 70 years after nuclear weapons emerged as a new technology, their consequences for stability continue to be debated.9

### 1NC [5]---Turn---Counterbalancing

#### China rise is peaceful now---encirclement makes it fast and hostile.

Goldstein 20, associate professor in the Strategic Research Department at the US Naval War College. (Lyle, 7-22-2020, "China’s Putative Threat to U.S. National Security", Published in *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/chinas-putative-threat-us-national-security)

Factions and interests on both the right and the left are now disturbingly united in an effort to cast China as the next multidimensional threat to the U.S.—on par with or even exceeding that of the Soviet Union in its dimensions. Many of those interests, moreover, are poised to profit from such a characterization. A few obvious facts, however, are worth repeating when considering the putative threat posed by China to U.S. national security: China has not resorted to any significant use of force in more than three decades, it has no foreign bases, and it remains rather weak (compared with U.S. forces) in the domains of power projection and nuclear war fighting. In the coming decades, all of those metrics may reverse, and China could morph from a bungling, paranoid panda into a fire‐​breathing, goose‐​stepping dragon. It seems likely that Beijing will have the requisite resources, bureaucratic discipline, and talent to make such a transition. Moreover, it is not short of strategists advocating for more aggressive steps to counter the United States.41 Washington’s overall goal should be to forestall that metamorphosis, in part by acknowledging China’s security concerns and by seeking compromises on the many issues that divide the United States and China, as outlined in the previous section. It is worth reiterating that Beijing is planning neither to attack the United States nor to conquer East Asia. Rather, its foreign policy behavior has, by and large, comported itself well with current international norms—in rather stark contrast to Moscow’s much more confrontational approach toward the West.

#### Finishing

Shifrinson 21, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. (Joshua R. Itzkowitz, Winter 2021, “Neo-Primacy and the Pitfalls of US Strategy toward China”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 43:4, 89-90)

Trends in military spending and recent economic developments suggest China’s capacity to oppose neo-primacy and a US drive to reclaim untrammeled preeminence. On one level, China currently devotes a smaller share of its economic wealth to military purposes than the United States, yet it has still managed to reduce American military advantages. This implies that Beijing could do quite a bit to frustrate American policy simply by allocating more to international purposes; if the United States feels pressured by a China that spends 2 percent of its GDP on defense, a China that spends 3 or 4 percent of GDP on defense—roughly what the United States has spent since the Cold War—would present a still larger problem and place the United States in an even worse position.55

Nor is it just military spending that underlines neo-primacy’s limitations. After all, ongoing efforts to decouple the US and Chinese economies—designed partly to limit Chinese growth—has pushed Beijing toward fostering a self-sustaining domestic economy able to withstand “sustained acrimony with the United States.” Given this, it is reasonable to infer that additional economic efforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing Chinese responses.56 Considering, too, that China’s economy has grown at a faster rate than the United States’ (even during COVID-19) and that the country has worked to narrow the USChina technological gap,57 the PRC’s ability to keep pace with the United States cannot be discounted.58 Shifts in the distribution of power since the Cold War make neo-primacy self-defeating by enabling China to match US efforts while risking US national security along the way. In this sense, neoprimacy risks exacerbating the very problem it seeks to address.

#### Confronting China causes overstretch and escalation spirals.

Depetris 8-18-2020, fellow at Defense Priorities and a columnist at the Washington Examiner. (Daniel Depetris, "China isn't the Soviet Union, and the US needs to find a different way to compete", *Business Insider*, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-needs-to-find-different-way-to-compete-with-china-2020-8)

Unfortunately, simplifying China as a modern-day Soviet Union misdiagnoses the problem and leads to a faulty cure. Combatting Chinese power everywhere and anywhere will exhaust the US, deplete its resources and weaken US power over the long-term.

For nearly 30 years, the Washington foreign policy establishment has gotten used to the United States being the paramount power in the global system. But this is no longer the world we are living in.

While the US is still the world's largest military and economic power, China is a close second. Since the dawn of the century, the Chinese economy has increased from $1.2 trillion to $14.3 trillion. China's exponential growth has allowed the CCP to invest additional resources into building up a capable, modernized and proficient military, including a world-class navy.

With its frequent forays into Japanese waters, flyovers across the Taiwan Straits, and trillion-dollar Belt and Road initiative in Eurasia, China is doing what rising powers have done throughout history — translating its economic success into geopolitical leverage. A US policy of containment would have the adverse affect of heightening the sense of alarmism in Beijing.

The U.S. can and should compete with China economically. But it should do so responsibly in order to prevent this competitiveness from drifting into military affairs.

A decoupling from China, Washington's largest trading partner outside of North America, is not a realistic proposal. A complete severance of economic ties will produce unprecedented pain for middle-class Americans and roil the international financial system.

A military-to-military showdown, meanwhile, simply entrenches hardline positions in both Washington and Beijing and lessens the credibility of those who call for dialogue and deescalation.

#### Containment causes war from accidents and miscalc.

Klare 20, professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association. (Michael T., 6-12-2020, "A Full-Blown Cold War With China Could Be Disastrous", *The Nation*, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/a-full-blown-cold-war-with-china-could-be-disastrous/)

HOT WAR

And never forget that cold wars always risk becoming hot ones. Looking back, it’s easy enough to remember those years of the US-USSR standoff as a relatively war-free era, since the two superpowers were fearful that a direct conflict of any sort between them might spark an all-out thermonuclear conflagration, leaving a planet in ruins. In reality, though, both sides engaged in a grim assortment of bloody “proxy wars”—regional conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, among other places, involving troops from one superpower and local allies armed by the other. In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union nearly found themselves in direct conflict on several occasions. The most notable, of course, was the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when Moscow installed nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in Cuba and the United States nearly went to war—which would probably have turned into a nuclear conflict—to remove them. Only a last-ditch negotiating effort by President John F. Kennedy and his Russian counterpart, Nikita Khrushchev, averted such an outcome.

It’s easy enough to imagine that both contemporary versions of such proxy conflicts and of the Cuban missile crisis could emerge from a growing confrontation with China. An incident on the Korean Peninsula, no matter how it was sparked, could quickly turn into just such a proxy war. The greatest danger, however, would be US and Chinese forces facing off directly, perhaps due to a naval clash in the East or South China Sea.

At present, American and Chinese warships encounter each other on a regular basis in those waters, often coming within shooting (or even ramming) range. The US Navy insists that it’s conducting permissible “freedom of navigation operations” (FRONOPS) in international waters. The Chinese—claiming ownership of, and often building up, the many small atolls and islets that dot those seas—accuse the American ships of infringing on their national maritime territory. On occasion, Chinese gunboats have sailed dangerously close to them, forcing them to shift course to avoid a collision. As such incidents multiply and tensions increase, the risk of a serious face-off involving loss of life on one or both sides is bound to grow, possibly providing the spark for a full-scale military confrontation. And there can be no question of one thing: An intensifying Cold War with China will only increase the odds of such a thing happening.

No one can say at what point you or any of us will begin to feel the direct effects of this new Cold War, only that, as tensions and hostile acts heighten, the consequences will prove harsh indeed. So cheer now, if you approve of measures already taken to isolate and punish Beijing, but think carefully before you embrace a full-blown Cold War with China and all that it will entail.

## ADVANTAGE TWO

### 1NC [3]---Solvency---Time/Rebound

#### The plan triggers re-consolidation---empirics.

Karabell 20, WIRED contributor and president of River Twice Research. (Zachary, 1-23-2020, "Don't Break Up Big Tech", *Wired*, https://www.wired.com/story/dont-break-up-big-tech/)

The problems fueling “break them up” are valid; breaking them up is not the solution. To begin with, antitrust enforcement has been romanticized well in excess of its accomplishments. The breakup in 1984 of the monopolistic AT&T into eight companies unleashed competition for a time, lowering prices and improving services. Eventually, however, as landlines gave way to wireless, the industry reconsolidated and regulators relaxed. Today telecom is dominated by a reconstituted AT&T along with Verizon, with Sprint as a distant third (yet still immense) player. The court-mandated breakup of Standard Oil in 1911 was the culmination of the most significant antitrust action ever, but the company’s dozens of offshoots eventually recombined into massive oil companies that maintain tremendous power. (ExxonMobil and Chevron are the two most notable.) That breakup also made the wealthy Rockefeller family even wealthier, as their shares in one company became shares in many—almost all of which doubled quickly and then continued their upward trajectory from there.

It’s debatable whether antitrust enforcement has ever been particularly effective. Even a charitable reading of its legacy suggests that the first effect of disrupting Big Tech might be to enrich the oligopoly’s shareholders, which is certainly not what advocates would want. In fact, as I argued in that earlier WIRED column, industrial conglomerates often spin off businesses strategically. For instance, United Technologies is about to cut loose its multibillion-dollar divisions Otis Elevators and Carrier (one of the world’s largest HVAC companies) as a means of unlocking shareholder value. One wonders why Silicon Valley executives haven’t gone down this path; perhaps the mantras of integration and a hubristic belief that they will never actually be forced to break up has shut down consideration of those strategies.

Would a forced breakup at least be effective at dispersing power? Let’s say that Facebook were strong-armed into disassembling itself. Its logical components would be legacy Facebook (individual pages), Facebook for business, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Oculus. You might be able to slice it even thinner, but assume Facebook would become five companies. Facebook currently has a market capitalization of just over $600 billion. That total market cap wouldn’t be divided equally among the five new companies; WhatsApp might struggle given its lack of discernible income, while Instagram might soar. It’s likely, however, that the resulting businesses would have a combined valuation greater than $600 billion, assuming it follows past patterns and that the tech industry remains robust.

Now imagine each of the Big Tech giants gets disassembled in this way. We might end up with a landscape of 30 companies instead of half a dozen. A quintupling of industry players would, by definition, create a more competitive field. But competition in the antitrust framework, stretching back to the original Sherman Anti-Trust Bill in 1890 and then subsequent legislation such as the Clayton Bill in 1914, is not a virtue or need in and of itself. It is the means to a set of ends—namely, “economic liberty,” unfettered trade, lower prices, and better services for consumers. By itself, competition does not guarantee anything.

Meanwhile, it’s hard to see how going from six companies to 30 would give consumers any more choice of services or more control over their data, or how it would help to nurture small businesses and lower costs to consumers and society. Perhaps there would be openings for companies with different business models, ones that brand themselves as valuing privacy and empowering individual ownership of data. This can’t be ruled out, but the nature of data selling and data mining is so embedded in the current models of most IT companies that it is very hard to see how such businesses could thrive unless they charged more to consumers than consumers have so far been willing to pay. In the meantime, the 30 new megacompanies would still have immense competitive advantages over smaller startups.

Would the market frictions and disruptions caused by a breakup be worth the possibility that such privacy-focused companies might succeed? Would cracking the current megacompanies into a set of slightly smaller ones effectively balance consumer needs and economic liberty? You may need to break eggs to make an omelet, but breaking eggs alone doesn’t make one.

### 1NC [6]---Thumpers---Democracy

#### Trump and the Capitol siege thump democracy.

Diamond 21, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. (Larry, "The Capitol Siege Is the Wake-up Call America Shouldn’t Have Needed", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-07/capitol-siege-wake-call-america-shouldnt-have-needed)

Yesterday’s assault on the United States Capitol by a right-wing extremist mob may have only modestly damaged the building, but it gravely injured the prestige of American democracy. The United States’ authoritarian adversaries are gloating. China’s Communist Youth League, echoing U.S. reactions to the 2019 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, called the storming of the Capitol a “beautiful sight.” And America’s democratic allies, who well understand the importance of U.S. democratic leadership to the global cause of freedom, have been badly shaken by the images of ruffians rampaging through the world’s most powerful democratic assembly on the day of its most important deliberative task: certifying the results of the presidential election. In the wake of this calamity, American political and civic leaders now face an urgent imperative to repair the fabric of U.S. democracy.

The siege of the Capitol was a tragedy, but it was also a wake-up call. At this juncture, there is no evidence to suggest a carefully laid plot by organized or well-trained militias. One shudders to imagine what might have transpired had that been the case. If a ragtag band of the radically aggrieved and conspiracy minded could force members of the United States Congress to break off pieces of House furniture to defend themselves, and to evacuate their chambers in distress, what could a serious insurrection have done? The first imperative of any democracy is to physically secure and protect itself—its people, its public officials, and its institutions. Rudely reminded of that fact, the country could be spared a far worse tragedy in the future.

Yet it should not have taken an assault on the legislature to alert Americans to the dangers lurking just beneath the surface of their political discourse. Analysts have warned for years about the erosion of the United States’ democratic norms and about the growing readiness of its deeply polarized electorate to condone or embrace political violence. In a December 2019 survey, the Voter Study Group found that one in five Americans who identified as either Democrats or Republicans felt that violence would be at least “a little” justified if the candidate from the opposing party won the 2020 presidential election. Even more disturbing, about one in ten members of both parties said that there would be “a lot” or “a great deal” of justification for violence if the opposing party won.

While Democrats and Republicans appeared similarly open to post-election violence, there was one big difference between the two parties. The leader of the Republican Party—President Donald Trump—signaled that he would reject the outcome of the election if he lost. Repeatedly over the course of the 2020 campaign, Trump stoked doubts about the credibility of the election, dismissing unfavorable poll results as “fake” and hinting ominously of coming electoral fraud. Trump’s relentless assaults on the integrity of mail-in balloting and refusal to commit to accepting the election result augured a post-election crisis of legitimacy that many, including myself, warned of in advance. The present emergency is, to paraphrase the title of Gabriel García Márquez’s famous novel, the chronicle of a crisis foretold.

For the last four years, Trump has been the arsonist in chief, lighting the populist flames of rumor and outrage. After a violent white supremacist rally in Charlottesville in 2017, he insisted that “very fine people” were on both sides of the conflict. Later, he retweeted a threat of civil war if he were to be impeached. In the United States and around the world, democrats should ponder how, even after four years of constant abuse of democratic norms and a tragically incompetent response to the coronavirus pandemic, Trump was able to secure more votes than any presidential candidate in American history save for Joe Biden. Part of the answer has to do with Trump’s craven enablers and hangers-on. Even the most charismatic demagogue cannot prevail on his own. He needs accomplices. It takes a party to subvert democracy.

Trump may be detached from reality at this point, but his cunning loyalists and his accomplices in Congress and in his administration know full well the compromises they have made with truth and decency. They are guilty of the most common offense in the destruction of democracy, what the late political scientist Juan Linz called “semiloyalty”: “a willingness to encourage, tolerate, cover up, treat leniently, excuse, or justify the actions of other participants that go beyond the limits of peaceful, legitimate … politics in a democracy.” Yesterday, many of these semiloyalists in Congress continued to support Trump’s outrageous effort to reverse the outcome of the election, even after the president goaded a rally of his extremist supporters into carrying their explosive rage to Capitol Hill—just as he had encouraged the protesters (some armed) who flooded into Michigan’s state capitol in late April.

Since as far back as ancient Greece, political theorists have fretted about the potential for democracy to give way to populist tyranny. The genius—early and imperfect though it was—of American democracy was that it checked, balanced, and dispersed power so that a demagogue could not become a tyrant. But institutional checks are only as strong as the people willing to enforce them. The Roman poet Juvenal’s famous question persists: “Who will guard the guardians themselves?”

#### The Capitol siege was a symptom of democracy’s problems.

Mehta 21, Contributing Editor at the Indian Express. He has been vice-chancellor of Ashoka University and president, Centre Policy Research, New Delhi, one of India's top think tanks. (Pratap Bhanu, 1-8-2021, "US might recoil from Capitol siege. But its democracy will remain riven by internal conflicts", *Indian Express*, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/us-might-recoil-from-capitol-siege-but-its-democracy-will-remain-riven-by-internal-conflicts-7137499/)

One of the more intriguing quotations associated with the Capitol Hill complex is by Rufus Choate, “We have built no temples but the Capitol, and we consult no common oracle but the Constitution.” On January 6, the Capitol was symbolically desecrated, and the authority of the Constitution was challenged. The desecration was not carried out by external enemies, but encouraged by the President of the United States, egging on loutish and armed groups like the Proud Boys to intimidate an elected Congress. They, some of them armed, made it to the inner precincts of Congress and disrupted the proceedings. In one instant, that indelible image damaged the reputation of American democracy.

This breakdown in order was also attended by a confusion in language. What was this: A coup d’etat, an armed insurrection, a violent protest, an act of sedition? Whatever the technicalities, there is no doubt that this was an attempt to subvert the democratic process, and had the full blessings of the Commander in Chief, and of sections of the Republican Party. It is also tempting to see America as a Hollywood movie writ large; a pantomime show full of guns, violence and cartoon characters that fundamentally change nothing. Its institutions have shown great resilience. The electoral process stood up to President Trump’s assault. State officials and courts discharged their duty. Revulsion against Trump played a part in giving Democrats control of the Senate. Trump’s most powerful enablers, from Mitch McConnell to Mike Pence, withdrew from the precipice. Trump’s endgame will soon be over. But there is good reason to think that this storming of the Capitol may be part of a continuing nightmare, not an ephemeral bad dream.

The assault on the Capitol is a sign of many challenges. The first is the racial question. The politics of protest will remain racialised. It is difficult not to wonder if a Black Lives Matter kind of movement would have been allowed to assault the Capitol in this way; there is more than a touch of white entitlement here. But the Right has also convinced itself that it is the victim, that it is the Left that condones lawlessness. The distinction between a movement for justice and inclusion and a movement for the subversion of democracy will be lost in this partisan construction of protest.

Second, there is now going to be more generalised partisan suspicion of state agencies. If it is true, as appears to be the case, that the police did not do all it could to stop this storming, might even have mildly encouraged it, and is reluctant to arrest protestors, it will expose law enforcement agencies to even more conspiracy theories, about which sections of the state are part of which party’s deep state. When the instruments of order are not perceived to be neutral, it is a continuing problem for order. And the challenge is that it is hard to convince citizens of the political neutrality of institutions like the police after visible incidents like these. This is not a new problem, but it now goes to the heart of political partisanship at the highest level.

The third challenge is something the brilliant political scientist Paul Staniland has been alerting us to for years: The possibility of the growing militarisation of US politics. The US has always had an infrastructure of armed right wing groups like the Ku Klux Klan. But there now seems to be a reversal to a political climate where the mainstream political process openly legitimises them to an unprecedented degree. In a sense, cultivating a fear of a right-wing backlash is a time-honoured strategy to pressure the centre and the middle. One of the unintended challenges of Democrats controlling both Houses will be that discontent with politics now takes an extra political turn.

The result in Georgia was a testament to what political hard work can accomplish. But governing America, even with Democrats controlling both Houses of government, will not be easy. The most important transformation over the last few years is the institutionalisation of the infrastructure of hate and demagoguery across institutions, from media to civil society. This infrastructure is not going to vanish easily. Its goals are not just electoral victories. There is also a touch of cultural nihilism in this discourse, a will to cross all boundaries, that is not easily captured by our language of interests. How else would Trump take the place of Jesus? How else does one explain the deep QAnon conspiracist mindset that has taken more hold in politics than one could have imagined?

The Republican Party may have pulled away from the brink. But there is little sign that it will not continue to fuel the politics of resentment.

The Democrats will face two challenges. The divisions papered over in the battle over Trump will likely ensure that that small window of opportunity afforded for transformative change may not yield lasting results. And as the pandemic worsens, the convenient narrative of blaming it all on Trump will also begin to fall apart: After all, Democratic states like California and New York also have dismal records. The possibility of growing generalised distrust of the liberal democratic project cannot be ruled out.

Strong institutions can be, for a while, compatible with a deepening civil war of sorts, as conflicts get removed from the arena of bargaining to more fundamental conflicts of identity. But the lines of what is acceptable in politics have also shifted each time. America might recoil from the incident at Capitol Hill, invoke the 25th Amendment to protect the republic from further harm, or impeach Trump to send a message. But that American democracy has come to this is already a sign of its potential for strife.

There is a great deal of creativity in America. Technological disruption and economics have the power to change the narrative. But it is hard to shake off the feeling that liberal democracy in America will continue to come under more stress, riven by its own internal conflicts and confusion of values. The rest of the world might feel some schadenfreude at America’s divisions. But regimes in Moscow and Beijing quietly taking succour from the Capitol falling is not good for global freedom either.

# 1NR

## K

### 1NR---Perm

#### Damage control DA. The perm is a liberal corrective that interposes Black radical theorizing between genocidal logics.

King 17, Assistant Professor of Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University. (Tiffany, Spring 2017, “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight”, *Critical Ethnic Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pg. 173-174)

As an example of how the protocols, codes of conduct, and politesse of postcolonial “business as usual” unfold in the university, I reflect on my encounters as a student and now professor in the graduate classroom, reading scholarly texts, listening, and taking part in scholarly critique and the collegial repartee that occurs at academic conferences. Within these scenarios, I have observed the decorum of supposedly “engaged and rigorous” critique proceed in the following ways. Often postcolonial interventions into colonial or critical theory travel through phases, stages of progression, and levels of engagement with continental philosophy. First, in order to demonstrate your scholarly due diligence, capacity for rigor, and abstraction, you must learn and rehearse the origins of and become fluent in the language, idioms, and grammar of Deleuze and Guattari or whichever white scholar is in fashion. Second, you must figuratively inhabit and empathize with the white scholar’s very personal and particular existential and ethical questions (even if you cannot relate to her particular kind of situatedness or experience). It is often in graduate seminars where you have been asked—and we have been trained as faculty—to have you think about what it must have been like to be Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, or Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in the moment in which they lived. Imagine the trials and tribulations of being a European bourgeois male maverick in the academy and civil society. In other words, you must internalize and perform this worldview as if it applies to you. After you internalize and perform, the third thing that you are allowed but by no means required to do is list the problems with this theory or worldview. Once you have identified the problems, even irreconcilable ones, you are encouraged to make an intervention or slight adjustment to the discourse or theory by asserting that you will now put Indigenous or Black life at the center of this body of thought. The challenge or intervention usually reads as “what if we put Native or Black studies at the center of Deleuzoguattarian thought?”

Although we may become disillusioned with and challenge a metanarrative, we are rarely encouraged to do what Eve Tuck does when she “Break[s] Up with Deleuze.” We are often prevented from getting to this stage of exasperation or justified disgust because we are not allowed to stop, look at, and more importantly feel the violence of Western turns in critical theory. Because of academic respectability politics that impose a kind of bourgeois politesse on all “communicative acts,” be they in person or in writing, it is impolite and more importantly irrational to be rendered devastated, enraged, mute, or immobile by the violent terms on which continental theory proceeds. One must tolerate that Deleuzoguattarian rhizomatic movements require Indigenous genocide. In fact, it is a necessary evil in order for the West to model the kind of unfettered nomadic movement that Deleuze and Guattari privilege. The neoliberal temporality of productivity also requires that scholars keep moving unaffected in the midst of the violence. In fact, one is required to work through and repair or do damage control for Deleuze and Guattari. This is what a “good scholar” does: puts Black or Native studies at the center of rhizomes rather than contesting the very terms in which lines of flight become epistemic entities. But how do we perform or act otherwise in the face of this kind of violence?

I am not arguing that academics should not read Deleuze and Guattari. As scholars committed to decolonial thought, we should read their work and understand how genocide and colonialism flow through it. However, we can read without becoming seduced and attached to the work. I turn again to the writings of Black and Native feminists as an example of what this critical disinterest and refusal might look like.32 As Simpson and Tuck and Yang argue, refusal can reroute one set of concerns and questions and redirect them toward other pursuits. Better yet, disenchantment and pessimism can compel one to perceive or think about new questions. Refusal and misandry can move you out of the circuit that the corporate university imposes on critical thinking: know, internalize, perform, disagree, and then center yourself.

### 1NR---Democracy Link

#### Democracy advantage is an idealized myth that whitewashes anti-black repression.

Hesse 17, Associate Professor in the Department of African American Studies at Northwestern University. (Barnor, July 2017, “White Sovereignty (…), Black Life Politics: ‘The N\*\*\*\*r They Couldn’t Kill’”, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 116:3, pg. 583-584, doi 10.1215/00382876-3961494)

Police Killings, Black Deaths

There is little in the West’s idealizations of Western democracy that does not become a mantra despite evidence that repeatedly belies these idealizations. The Kantian inspired idea that Western democracies do not go to war against each other has a corollary in the idea that Western democracies do not kill their own citizens. These reassuring nostrums conventionally overlook how both ethical projections assume a colonial-racial social order of white individuals as the primordial basis of citizenship. Black citizenship is a problem for Western democracies. This is one way we can read what has been witnessed since 2014 through the high definition of social media in its take on black protests in the United States where the names of Michael Brown, Rekika Boyd, Eric Garner, Aiyanna Stanley Jones, Sandra Bland, Tamir Rice, and so many others before and after, have become black symptoms and symbols of racial policing. The repeatable and unnecessary deaths of black [persons] ~~men, women, and children~~ in untimely encounters with urban racial policing, raises all kinds of unasked questions about their racial meaning and the institution of that repetition. “Hands Up Don’t Shoot,” “I Can’t Breathe,” “No Justice, No Peace,” “Say Her Name,” and “Black Lives Matter” are all now political slogans that signify the irrepressible repetition of police violence against black citizens, both male and female, underscored by the rhetorical force of their own repetition. Ferguson, New York, Baltimore, Milwaukee, Chicago, and Charlotte are all now known as racially contested cities where police-related deaths of black individuals have galvanized uprisings and embodied opposition to the socially determined and spatially structured racial demise of black populations. Racial policing is socially dispersed in normalized, routine, institutional practices of disciplining and regulating black people, which, in nonrepresentational terms, is accomplished through enforcing the law and maintaining the order of democracy’s white citizenship against alternative or even supplemental claims of black citizenship. How else can we explain the racially coded law-and-order populisms that frequently mobilize specters of black criminal and political threats, which are deserving of elimination or repeated punishment to ensure the security of white civil society and which induce racial panic or backlash among white populations?

It is worth noting that in November 2014, less than three months after the black protests in Ferguson over the police killing of Michael Brown, USA Today published its analysis of the arrest records of 1,581 police departments “scattered from Connecticut to California” across the United States (Heath 2014). It reported that while the Ferguson police arrested black people at three times the rate of other communities, in other US cities the comparative arrest rate for black people was even higher, and in at least seventy police departments, the arrest rate for black people was “ten times higher than [for] people who are not black.” In March 2015, when the Department of Justice (2015: 2) published its report on the investigation into the Ferguson Police Department, they made the following observation:

This culture within FPD [Ferguson Police Department] influences officer activities in all areas of policing, beyond just ticketing. Officers expect and demand compliance even when they lack legal authority. They are inclined to interpret the exercise of free-speech rights as unlawful disobedience, innocent movements as physical threats, indications of mental or physical illness as belligerence. Police supervisors and leadership do too little to ensure that officers act in accordance with law and policy, and rarely respond meaningfully to civilian complaints of officer misconduct.

The report’s various references to police obsessions with “compliance,” “disobedience,” “threats,” and “belligerence” in the comportment of black persons was arguably indicative of police desires to supervise and violate black populations, perhaps ensuring the enduring racial segregation of civil society remains unbreached by black democratic resistance. In thinking about these findings of democratically sanctioned repetitions of racial policing, we should recognize two of its structural urban dimensions noted by the report. First, Ferguson was predominantly inhabited by black residents and the police force was largely white. This meant that the institutional relationality of race was reproduced constitutively as white domination and black subordination. Second, the report’s characterization of the police extended beyond the narrow confines of law enforcement and maintaining social order into a broader apparatus of liberal-democratic social control that combined racial profiling with racial hierarchy and racial segregation. This broader characterization of racial policing indicates there was something structural and repetitive about the history of race and its policing of black people at work there.